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Studies on the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure decisions 
in the emerging markets are still very limited. This study examined the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms, firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables on 
capital structure of Nigeria non-financial listed firms. Unlike the vast majority of previous 
studies, this study employed panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) model to analyse 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanism, firm characteristics and 
macroeconomic variables on capital structure of 106 Nigerian non-financial listed firms 
during the 2012 to 2016 period. The model was robust to any unit heterokedasticity and 
possible contemporaneous correlation issues. The results revealed that board structure 
(board size, board meeting and board independence) and ownership structure (managerial 
and institutional ownership) were negatively related to the total debt ratio, whereas block-
holder ownership and firm characteristics (firm age, firm size and firm growth) were 
positively related. In addition, the choice of external auditor (B4 audit firm) had no 
significant relationship to the total debt ratio of the sample firms. Control variables namely 
GDP and inflation rate were negatively related to the total debt ratio, whereas bank lending 
rate was positively related. Corporate governance in Nigeria is at its developing stage, the 
firms still has weak corporate governance mechanisms as compared to firms in developed 
countries. The study found that, corporate governance attributes and firm characteristics 
partly explained the capital structure of Nigeria firms. Nigeria firms’ manager should be 
aware of the benefits on the implementation of effective corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms. An effective implementation of the Corporate Governance Code 2011 issued 
by Security and Exchange Commission should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
Nigeria firms and the stock markets. To the author’s best knowledge, this study is among 
the few studies that utilised panels corrected standard errors model in providing evidence 
of the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on capital 
structure in Nigeria.  
 













Kajian tentang pengaruh mekanisma tadbir urus korporat terhadap keputusan struktur 
modal dalam pasaran baru muncul adalah masih sangat terhad. Kajian ini meneliti 
pengaruh mekanisma tadbir urus korporat, ciri-ciri syarikat dan pemboleh ubah 
makroekonomi terhadap struktur modal syarikat bukan kewangan Nigeria yang tersenarai. 
Tidak seperti kebanyakan kajian lepas, kajian ini mengunakan model panels corrected 
standard errors (PCSEs), untuk menganalisis hubungan di antara mekanisma tadbir urus 
korporat, ciri-ciri syarikat dan pemboleh ubah makroekonomi terhadap struktur modal di 
106 buah syarikat bukan kewangan Nigeria yang tersenarai pada tahun 2012-2016. Model 
ini adalah kukuh bagi mana-mana heterokedasticity unit dan isu korelasi komtemporari 
yang sesuai. Hasil kajian menunjukkan struktur lembaga (saiz lembaga, mesyuarat 
lembaga dan kebebasan lembaga) dan struktur pemilikan (pemilikan pengurusan dan 
institusi) berkaitan secara negatif kepada nisbah jumlah hutang, dan pemilikan pemegang 
blok dan ciri-ciri syarikat (umur syarikat, saiz syarikat dan pertumbuhan syarikat) pula 
berkaitan secara positif. Tambahan lagi, pemilihan juruaudit luar (firma audit B4) tidak 
mempunyai hubungan yang signifikan kepada nisbah jumlah hutang syarikat sampel. 
Pemboleh ubah kawalan iaitu KDNK dan kadar inflasi mempunyai perkaitan yang negatif 
kepada nisbah jumlah hutang, dan kadar peminjaman bank pula berkaitan secara positif. 
Pentadbir urus korporat di Nigeria berada pada tahap yang pembangunan syarikat-
syarikatnya mempunyai mekanisma tadbir urus korporat yang masih lemah berbanding 
dengan syarikat-syarikat di negara-negara membangun. Kajian mendapati, sifat tadbir urus 
korporat dan ciri-ciri syarikat sebahagiannya menerangkan struktur modal syarikat-
syarikat di Nigeria. Pengurus syarikat di Nigeria perlu sedar mengenai faedah pelaksanaan 
pemantauan mekanisma tadbir urus korporat yang berkesan. Pelaksanaan Kod Tadbir Urus 
Korporat 2011 yang berkesan oleh Suruhanjaya Keselamatan dan Pertukaran perlu 
meningkatkan kecekapan dan keberkesanan syarikat-syarikat dan pasaran saham Nigeria. 
Kajian ini merupakan antara kajian yang menggunakan model corrected standard errors 
untuk memberikan bukti mengenai pengaruh mekanisma tadbir urus korporat dan ciri-ciri 
syarikat terhadap struktur modal di Nigeria.  
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 1.1 Background and Motivation of the Study 
Amongst a firm’s strategic decision making processes, the capital structure decision 
process is the most noticeable and essential process, and that is why it is a heated issue in 
corporate finance (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Bolton, 2016). Shafana (2016) explained that, 
the aim of the corporate finance decisions are to maximise the shareholders’ wealth. This 
is achieve through four major corporate finance decisions, namely, decisions on the 
dividend, working capital management, budgeting, and capital structure. Shafana (2016) 
argued further that, amongst these various corporate finance decisions, the capital structure 
decision is a key decision leading to meet the other three corporate finance decisions.  
 
The issue of capital structure started to generate a great interest continuously in accounting 
and finance, ever since the publication of the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). Modigliani and Miller (1958) formulated a proposition that in a perfect capital 
market free of taxes, transaction cost, and other frictions, capital structure would be 
irrelevant in ascertaining firm value. This proposition, popularly known as the MM model, 
led to numbers of research works on capital structure with researchers examining the 
robustness of the model.  
 
However, despite extensive empirical work and literature on capital structure (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984; Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 2008; Graham & Leary, 2011; Fama & French, 





on capital structure has yet to be settled. According to Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011), the 
capital structure decision has been a conundrum for accounting and finance researchers. 
Supporting the statement, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) also argued that this conundrum is 
due to the fact that the determinants of the capital structure decision are still indefinite. 
 
How a firm develops the strategy of financing its growth and operations using different 
sources of financing is capital structure. However, the proportion of debt to equity 
(Debt/Equity) that gives an insight into how risky a firm is, is what financial analysts refer 
to as the capital structure (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic 2001). Myers 
(2001) explained that the mixture of equity and other sources of funds that the firms’ use 
to finance its business activities is what capital structure is trying to explain. Sources of 
capital structure funds are from share capital (shareholders’ funds) and creditors’ funds. 
These sources are the make-up of the capital structure of the firm. 
 
Myers (2001) further argued that a universal theory of capital structure is not in existence 
and there is no need to expect one, except for some situational theories. These situational 
or conditional theories are the ones that allow the stakeholders of the firm and the financial 
analysts to define the optimal value of the financing cost and the financial structure of a 
firm. Firms’ optimal capital structures, on the other hand, are different in practice because 
so many corporate governance mechanisms, firm characteristics, and macroeconomic 






Sound corporate governance principles are the foundation upon which the trust of investors 
and lenders is built. Therefore, to ensure the protection of the individual and collective 
interest of all the firm’s stakeholders, effective mechanisms and philosophy that entail the 
processes and structure that will facilitate the creation of the shareholder value through the 
management of the firm’s affairs is needed. Keasey, Thompson, and Wright (1997) 
described corporate governance as the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
affairs of a firm for the business prosperity and corporate accountability. Its ultimate 
objective is to realise long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the interests 
of other stakeholders.  
 
The need for effective corporate governance mechanisms arises from the separation of 
ownership from the control which is generally associated with the existence of agency 
problems. According to modern corporate finance theories, agency cost is one of the 
determinants of capital structure; whereas, corporate governance is structured to alleviate 
agency issues (Agyei, & Owusu 2014). Thus, corporate governance and capital structure 
are linked through their association with agency costs (Hassan & Butt, 2009). 
 
According to Uwuigbe (2014), agency problems arise as a result of the relationships 
between shareholders and managers and are based on conflicts of interest within the firm. 
When the owners and agents are separate entities, the relationships between them often 
bring conflicts of interest. According to Lessing (2009), corporate governance basically 
exists to provide the necessary checks and balances between owners and agents; this 





serve as an active monitoring mechanism that will prevent the firm’s management from 
adjusting debt to their own interests. Also, corporate governance mechanisms improve the 
alignment of the management and the shareholders’ interests and mitigate any 
opportunistic behaviour, resulting from such conflict of interests (Kazemian & Zuraidah, 
2015). 
 
Craig (2005) explained that corporate governance is defined and practised in different 
ways, globally, depending upon the relative power of the owners and agents. It entails the 
procedures, customs, policies, and laws that affect the way firms are controlled, 
administered or directed. He further argued that an important objective of corporate 
governance is to ensure accountability and transparency for those who are involved in the 
policy implementation of the firm through mechanisms that will reduce principal-agent 
conflicts. 
 
Keasey and Wright (1993) classified corporate governance mechanisms into internal and 
external mechanisms. The internal mechanisms include the board composition, audit 
committees, and managerial and non-managerial shareholdings, including the institutional 
and blocked shareholdings. External mechanisms include: the market for corporate control 
and stock market evaluation of corporate performance. Damak (2013), Gebba (2015), and 
Miko and Kamardin (2016) supported the two distinct classification of corporate 
governance mechanisms (internal and external mechanisms). The internal are means in the 





directors, ownership structure, audit committees, mutual monitoring, and supervisory 
board.  
 
The external corporate governance mechanisms are those controls that are exercised 
through the external auditor and outdoor market, including: financial market, market goods 
and services, and labour market managers. Apparently, the study of the corporate 
governance mechanisms and capital structure will, therefore, give a tremendous strategic 
framework to the decisions on the firm debt ratio context. This study has been conducted 
to show the influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms (Board of directors, 
statutory auditor, and ownership structure) towards the firms’ financial structures in 
Nigerian listed firms.  
  
Most of the empirical studies on corporate governance are majorly concerned with the 
effect of good corporate governance on a firm’s performance and also the effect of 
ownership structure on the firm’s financial structure (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang 
2002). Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001), Livot (2005), and Bhagat and Bolton (2013) 
made further arguments regarding the concept of corporate governance mechanisms. They 
argued that, corporate governance mechanisms are also related with the firm’s capital 
structure and other major corporate finance decisions. Liao, Mukherjee, and Wang (2012) 
supported this argument by saying that, with good corporate governance practice, firms 
will be able to manage their information efficiently and this normally helps in reducing the 
aggregate cost of capital which will effectively assist the firms to make effective and 





According to Muthama, Mbaluka, and Kalunda (2013), the influence of macroeconomic 
variables on the firm’s capital structure is another current baffling issue for financial 
managers. Empirical research evidence, such as Booth, et al. (2001); Gajurel (2005); and 
Muthama, et al. (2013), have proved that there is a linkage between the firm’s capital 
structure and the country’s macroeconomic variables. According to Gajurel (2005), major 
macroeconomic policies, such as monetary and fiscal policies, pursued by a country can 
significantly influence the firm’s capital structure decisions. Gajurel (2005) further argued 
that a reduction in the country’s GDP growth rate tends to cause firms to depend more on 
debt financing than equity financing. This is also similar to the findings of Booth, et al. 
(2001). More recent work in the African context by Muthama, et al. (2013) implied that 
the GDP growth rate, interest rate, and inflation are major macroeconomic or external 
factors that can influence the decision on capital structure.   
 
Prior research examined the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on corporate 
capital structure decisions. A few studies like Ezeoha and Francis (2010); Ganiyu and 
Abiodun (2012); Uwuigbe (2013); and Uwuigbe (2014), examined the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure of the listed firms 
in Nigeria. However, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, there are still limited 
studies that examined the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics on capital structure decisions of non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
The 2007/2008 global economic crisis has substantial influenced and caused fluctuations 





financial crisis has had a significant impact on the Nigerian stock market in the short-run 
and long-run. The economy was brought down as the capital market in Nigeria crashed 
resulting in the loss of capital, assets, and investments (Peter 2015). In 2011, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Nigeria reviewed its corporate governance code with 
the aim of providing the best corporate governance practices within the Nigerian listed 
firms. The introduction of the reviewed corporate governance code, known as the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 2011, and the instability in the 
Nigerian macroeconomic variables, were amongst the recent issues in the Nigerian 
business environment. These issues motivated the researcher to conduct research on the 
influence of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on firm capital 
structure levels. 
 
1.2 Problem Statements 
A capital structure decision is a vital firm’s management decision that greatly affects the 
shareholders’ wealth, and the profitability and sustainability of the firm. Therefore, how a 
firm determines the mix of debt and equity is important to fund providers and managers, 
because a wrong mix of debt and equity can seriously affect the performance and the 
survival of the firm.  Apparently, the firm’s capital structure decisions involve a vast range 
of policy affairs within and outside the direct control of management of the firm. According 
to Green, Murinde, and Suppakitjarak (2002), micro and macro policy issues influence 
firms’ capital structure decisions. At the micro level, there are the influences of corporate 
governance practices and firm characteristics; whilst at the macro level, there are the 





and other monetary policy regulations (Green, et al. 2002). Therefore, for the firm’s 
management to decide on the appropriate mix of debt and equity that will ensure that the 
firm continues as a going concern, micro and macro policy issues should be of great 
concern to the firm’s management. Hence, the firm’s financial choice is very vital to the 
ability of the firm to achieve the optimal needs of its stakeholders.  
 
The recent global financial crisis and financial distress in many large firms around the 
globe have brought more concern to various firms’ stakeholders (Lin, Hutchinson, & Percy, 
2015). Researchers have argued that the high rate of collapses in firms is an outcome of 
weak corporate governance practices that could not benefit the firms for better access to 
financing, less cost of capital, better consideration for all the firms’ stakeholders and better 
firm performance. (Palmrose, 2013).  
 
However, according to Sheikh and Wang (2012), firms that have sound corporate 
governance mechanisms usually witness active growth and also grasp better opportunities 
in attracting capital from investors and lenders to smooth their business operations. 
Therefore, there is a need to look beyond the relationship between the firm’s specific 
characteristics, (examples: firm size, profitability, growth, age, risk, tangibility, and 
liquidity) and capital structure decisions which are the bases of most of the recent empirical 
studies on capital structure (Buvanendra, Sridharan, & Thiyagarajan, 2017). The influence 
of corporate governance mechanisms is also a vital issue in making decisions on the firm’s 






Scholars have examined the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
capital structure (Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; Nadeem & Sheikh, 2012; and Conyon & He, 
2014). The general problem has been that there has been no agreement amongst the 
researchers on the extent of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and capital structure. The consequence of the inconsistency in the research findings is that 
corporate managers do not know, and may not be able to implement the best practices for 
corporate governance (El-Faitouri, 2014). However, the firm’s managers need to be aware 
of the benefits of the implementation of effective internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
As Africa’s largest emerging economy, Nigeria has transformed herself into a large market 
oriented economy. As part of the transformation, in 2011, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in Nigeria reviewed its corporate governance code with the aim of 
providing the best corporate governance practices within the Nigerian listed firms, and also 
to improve investor confidence and trust in management and promote the economic 
development of the country.  
 
Despite the above corporate governance code’s review, Nigeria still presents challenges 
for corporate governance practices for a few reasons. First, according to Arowolo and Che-
Ahmed (2016), reports of business mergers, bankruptcys and firm collapse in Nigeria in 
the last decade is very alarming which is due to insufficient monitoring and enforcement 
of the code of corporate governance. Secondly, Nigeria was recently ranked 148th out of 





lack of transparency and widespread corruption in the corporate sectors. Also, institutional 
differences exist between developed markets and Nigeria’s market. According to 
Rajagopalan and Zang (2008), these differences in business environments and practices, 
and the enforcement of the corporate governance code are the major gaps between the 
adoption of the corporate governance codes and the actual implementation of these codes.  
Hence, the efficiency of the reviewed corporate governance code and its impact on the 
capital structure decisions of firms in Nigeria need to be empirically investigated.  
 
Most empirical research has focused on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
on performance. A great deal of the research that has analysed the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms on capital structure had been carried out in developed countries 
(Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004; Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Fosberg, 2004; Friend 
& Lang, 1988; and Mehran, 1992). Whereas, little is known about the developing countries 
that have different institutional structures (Abor, 2007; Bokpin & Arko, 2009; Kyereboah-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2006; and Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek, 2002). Findings from a 
particular country may not represent the other countries, which have different economies 
and business environments; as such, further research is needed to test the robustness of the 
studies outside the developed countries. 
 
According to Maher and Andersson (1999), corporate governance practices vary, not only 
across countries but also across firms and industry sectors. However, one of the most 
striking differences between the countries’ corporate governance systems are in the 





Wang (2014) also argued that, the practices of corporate governance mechanisms can be 
differentiated by the type of control, degree of ownership, and the identity of the controlling 
shareholders. The influence of corporate governance on firm performance has been well 
researched, but the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics 
on firm capital structure is little known.  Apart from the fact that there is a dearth of research 
related to the issue of corporate governance and capital structure in Nigerian firms, most 
of the available studies also provided contradictory findings.  
 
Shehu (2011) concluded that, like other developing economies, the area of research for 
capital structure is still unexplored in Nigeria. Therefore, the need for an investigation of 
the relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure levels 
of the listed firms in Nigeria has become an essential action. According to Ogebe, Ogebe, 
and Alewi (2013), the difficulty facing firms in Nigeria has to do more with the financing 
choice, whether to opt for debt financing or equity financing, and the issue has been 
established as an immediate cause for a business failing and/or progressing.  It is evidently 
clear that both internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics (such 
as, firm size, firm growth, and firm age) alongside with the macroeconomic factor 
influence the capital structure levels (Muthama, et al., 2013). Thus, the central point of this 
study is to assess the level of their relationships and influences on the capital structure of 
the listed firms in Nigeria.   
 
Agency problems arise as a result of the relationships between shareholders and managers 





corporate governance strategy in Nigeria for sustainable development. Only with efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms, can firms have effective management of the capital 
structure, which will help the firm to gain competitive advantage and increase the 
profitability of the firm (Velnampy & Aloy, 2012). In spite of numerous studies on 
corporate governance, the agency problem still exists in Nigerian firms to date. This has 
affected the firms’ financing decisions thereby reducing their performances (Ahmadpour 
Jafari & Golmohammadi 2012).  
 
The capital structure decision of a firm has been proven to be associated with the firm’s 
corporate governance practices. For example, the board and ownership structures of the 
firm have been found to have an influence on the firm’s capital structure decisions (Lawal, 
2012). In addition, Vakilifard, Gerayli, Yanesari, and Ma’atoofi (2011) argued that more 
non-executive directors in a firm will help to reduce the amount of debt for the provision 
of finance due to the presence of more effective supervision and control. 
 
However, a lack of effective control of corporate firms as a result of the weak corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria has led to the detriment of shareholders and created a class 
of stakeholders who have lost interest in the system thereby causing the collapse of many 
firms in Nigeria (Quadri 2010).  The reasons for this have been that firms could not get 
better access to the financing choice, have been faced with a higher cost of capital, and 
there has been no better consideration for all the firm’s stakeholders and better firm 
performance. Quadri (2010) argued further that, the collapse of the firms will lead to the 





country’s firms. Therefore, financial choices affecting the firm’s capital structure are very 
prominent amongst the firms’ financial decisions based on the needs to increase the 
stakeholders’ investment returns and the ability of the firms to deal with a competitive 
environment. 
 
According to Amos and Jeremiah (2013), Nigeria’s capital market has been characterised 
with an inactive debt market, shallow market nature, the buy and hold syndrome of 
Nigerian shareholders, and also the unconducive social-political environment. Thus, 
Nigerian firms rely heavily on the money market rather than the capital market for their 
operation requirements, making the money market dominant in the Nigerian financial 
market system. This has put a question on the relationship between micro and macro policy 
issues on the firms’ capital structure decisions.    
 
Yisau (2016) noted that, firms in developing economies like Nigeria are operating in a 
business environment that has been characterised with poor institutional quality, and 
imbalanced macroeconomics that have led to capital market inefficiency, very high 
transaction cost, moral hazards, agency-related problems, and poor corporate governance.  
As a result of which, there has been growing anticipation of bankruptcy, financial distress, 
and restructuring amongst Nigerian listed firms (Nduka & Ucheahara, 2016).  
 
According to Echekoba and Ananwude (2016), due to the cost associated with the 
operations in most of the sectors in the Nigerian listed firms (e.g., oil and gas, construction, 





firms in those sectors as a means of enhancing their liquidity position. Thus, many firms 
are dependent on retained earnings which is the least expensive means of financing. 
However, in Nigeria most of the big firms, particularly indigenous firms are not buoyant 
enough to finance major investments from retained earnings or equity capital (Echekoba 
& Ananwude, 2016). 
 
The possible bank loans that may be available, are short-term loans (over-draft), however, 
the interest rates that banks charge on this overdraft are high. In addition, the few banks 
that provide long-term loans to larger firms in Nigeria give them at higher lending rates as 
a result of the national currency devaluation by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) starting 
from 2014. Consequently, most of the firms in the country which are dependent on bank 
credit are now having difficulty in obtaining new loans whilst many have resorted to other 
forms of short-term debt, and some resort to loan restructuring. This loan restructuring can 
also post a signal to capital structure restructuring on the appropriate financial choice. Abor 
(2005) argued that different capital structure strategies have different influences on the 
sustainability and profitability of the firm. Thus, a lack of proper empirical examination by 
the firm managers of the capital structure strategies that the firm opts for would have an 
adverse effect on the firm’s performance and growth.  
 
An extensive review of the literature has revealed that the empirical works (Beger & 
Dipatti, 2003; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; & Hassan 2009) mostly focused on the 
impact of corporate governance on the firm’s performance or examine the influence of 





governance mechanisms and capital structure decisions has not been extensively explored 
in the Nigerian context. 
 
Only a few studies, such as Brailsford, Oliver, and Pua (2002); Hussainey and Aljifri, 
(2012); Wen, et al. (2002); and Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008), investigated the relationship 
between board structure, ownership structure, and capital structure. Some studies (Wen, et 
al. 2002; Abor, 2007; Nadeem & Sheikh, 2012; and Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012) discussed 
the influence of corporate governance on capital structure decisions of firms for developed 
and emerging markets. Otnet (2006) stated that corporate governance is an important issue 
nowadays due to the different financial crises in Asia, Europe, and America.  
 
Empirical studies have shown that corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on 
the capital structure, but the direction of the relationship is mixed. Whilst some studies 
concluded that there is a positive significant relationship between corporate governance 
and capital structure (Rehman, Rehman, & Raoof, 2010; Saad, 2010; and Berger, & Diatti, 
2003), others concluded that there is a negative significant relationship (Abor, & Biekpe, 
2007; Hussaini & Aljifri, 2012 and Wen, et al. 2002). The studies have provided mixed 
results; whereas, the influence of corporate governance policies on the firm’s financial mix 
is of great concern to the firm’s management.  This study intends to fill a gap in the 
literature by illuminating the significant relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanisms, firm characteristics, and capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria. This 






1.3 Research Questions  
The research questions of this study were: 
1. Does a significant relationship exist between board structures (board size, board 
meetings, and board independence) and the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria?  
2. Does a significant relationship exist between ownership structures (block holder 
ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership) and the capital 
structure of the listed firms in Nigeria?  
3. Does a significant relationship exist between the firms’ specific characteristics 
(firm size, firm age, and firm growth) and the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria?  
4. Does a significant relationship exist between external auditor choice (Big 4 audit 
firms) and the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria?  
 
1.4         Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study were: 
1. To examine the significant relationship between board structures (board size, board 
meetings, and board independence) and the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria.  
2. To examine the significant relationship between ownership structures (block holder 
ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership) and the capital 





3. To examine the significant relationship between the firms’ specific characteristics 
(firm size, firm age, and firm growth) and the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria. 
4.  To examine the significant relationship between external auditor choice (Big 4 
audit firms) and the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria. 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study 
This study has examined the influence of the corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ 
specific characteristics on the capital structure decisions of  106 non-financial listed firms 
in Nigeria for a period of five (5) years from 2012 - 2016. This was due to the fact that in 
2011 a reviewed code of corporate governance for public companies was issued by the 
SEC. It has been effective from November 2011. For the purpose of this study, the 
dependent variable was the debt to total assets ratio (which was the capital structure) whilst 
the independent variables were the corporate governance mechanisms (board size, board 
meetings, board independence, block holder ownership, managerial ownership, 
institutional ownership, and external auditor) and firms’ specific characteristics (firm size, 
firm age, and firm growth). The control variables were the macroeconomic variables (GDP 
Growth Rate, Bank Lending Rate, and Inflation Rate). 
 
1.6        Significance of the Research 
The purpose of the study was to examine the influence of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm characteristics on the capital structure decisions of the non-financial 





Theoretical Significance  
This research work has examined the influence of the corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm characteristics on the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria. The agency 
theory establishes the influence of the monitoring mechanisms to reduce principal-agent 
conflicts and agency cost. The corporate governance literature identifies the internal and 
external monitoring mechanisms that can influence the firms’ capital structures. Hence, 
this study has examined the influence of the board and the ownership structure’s 
monitoring mechanisms on the firms’ capital structures. Capital structure and the corporate 
finance theory also establish the influence of firm characteristics that can influence the 
firms’ financial choices. This study, therefore, has sought to integrate board structure, 
ownership structure, and firm characteristics with firm capital structure in an attempt to 
extend the literature in the field of corporate governance and corporate finance.     
 
Empirical studies conducted in the past have led to the development of the, theories about 
the determination, influence and composition of the optimal capital structure. Some of 
these theories will be briefly reviewed in this study due to their relationship with corporate 
governance, firm characteristics, and capital structure. They are the trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory, and agency theory. Bokpin (2009) argued that some of these theories 
are specifically focused on the relationship between the firms’ characteristics and the firms’ 
financial structures, and they are also based on the assumptions of the macroeconomic 
variables’ stability. However, based on the empirical studies and theoretical framework 
conducted in the recent times, it has been proved that a relationship does exist between 





2002; Hussain & Aljifri, 2012; and Wen, et al., 2002). To this end, the agency theory is 
also relevant when describing the relationship between corporate governance and capital 
structure. 
 
Tests of the agency cost theory on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and capital structure enrich the literature on capital structure and agency cost 
issues. This research provides insights into the factors that are decisive in predicting firms’ 
capital structure from a combination of corporate governance mechanisms that affect a 
firm’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its resource utilisation.  
 
This research work has examined the relationship between the control and monitoring roles 
of the board and ownership structure on the capital structure. Also, the influence of firm 
characteristics on firm capital structure has been examined, and in line with the corporate 
governance framework, this study has integrated the agency theory and capital structure 
theories. The agency theory establishes the important role of the monitoring mechanisms 
to reduce the conflict between the principal and the agent, and also to reduce agency cost. 
Literature on corporate governance identifies many monitoring mechanisms, including the 
role of board size and its composition. Hence, this research work included board meetings 
with board size and board independence as board monitoring and control mechanisms that 
can influence capital structure, in an attempt to extend the agency theory’s monitoring 
mechanisms and literature in this field. To the author’s best knowledge, very few studies 
examine the relationship between board meetings and capital structure as a corporate 






The results of this study will also be of benefit to present and potential investors and the 
top managers of firms in Nigeria by showing the impact of the board, ownership, and firm 
characteristics on the capital structure decisions of their firms. The findings may help 
various stakeholders to identify the influence of corporate governance policies on the 
firms’ capital structure decisions so as to be more focused and efficient as a monitoring 
tool. By applying the study’s recommendations, the board of directors of the listed firms 
in Nigeria may institute better strategies to monitor the top management of their firms and, 
thereby, lower the company’s agency costs, reduce investment risk, and enhance corporate 
value. 
 
By showing the long-term benefits of a sound corporate governance structure on the firm’s 
financial decisions, the findings of the study may persuade both the board and top 
management to focus on merit and competency whilst recruiting top managers on factors 
that align the shareholders’ interests with those of the agents. In addition, by highlighting 
the positive outcomes of compliance with the corporate governance mechanisms policy, 
the board of directors and managers may be persuaded of the importance of effective 
corporate governance practices, the implementation of which would send a positive 
message to the market and improve firm value. 
 
Although this study has specific relevance to the needs of Nigerian firms, it is believed that 





similar social, political, and economic environments. The results of this study may be 
beneficial and applicable to these countries as well. 
 
Finally, the results of this study may be of interest to policy-makers and regulators as the 
influence of the monitoring policy on the firms’ financial choices has been identified, and 
it has been seen that there is a need to ensure that there is a real commitment for all the 
listed Nigerian firms to implement effective corporate governance mechanisms through 
improving the regulatory and enforcement corporate governance framework. This research 
work has examined the potential impact of the internal corporate governance mechanisms 
(Board of directors and ownership structure), external auditor choice, and firm 
characteristics on Nigerian firms’ capital structure levels. Exploring the association 
between corporate governance and capital structure is extremely important, especially after 
the implementation of the corporate governance code 2011, which was contended to 
enhance the efficiency of Nigeria’s stock market. 
 
The role of corporate governance practices on capital structure should be assessed 
periodically, especially when there has been an enactment of new rules and regulations, 
which has brought about new situations that businesses and investors have had to face. 
Limited information is available due to a dearth of prior studies examining these issues in 
Nigeria. Hence, it is imperative to conduct an in-depth study to assess the current status of 
corporate governance practices in order to identify a corporate governance policy that will 
bring about the active growth of the firm and also help it to grasp better opportunities in 





the firms’ management to determine the mix of debt and equity that will maximise the 
shareholders’ wealth and the sustainability of the firms is necessary. The findings will add 
value to the existing literature on corporate governance and capital structure, and serve as 
a reference for further research. 
 
1.7 Summary 
The capital structure decision is one of the most fundamental issues in a firm’s strategic 
decisions, and according to most of the theories of capital structure, such decisions can be 
affected by various factors amongst which corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics are more pronounced. Corporate governance mechanisms can greatly assist 
firms by infusing better management practices, effective control and accounting systems, 
stringent monitoring, effective regulation mechanisms, and utilisation of firms’ resources 
efficiently which will eventually result in the improvement of the firms’ performances.  
This chapter started with the background and motivation of the study where the basic 
foundation of this study was laid. This was followed by the research problem statement, 
where the relevant issues’, both empirical and theoretical, justifications were discussed. 
The research problem statement was followed by the research questions, research 
objectives, and the scope of the study. Consequently, the significance of the study was also 
discussed in the chapter. 
 






   CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 General review of Nigeria’s Economy 
Nigeria is a developing country, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and one of the largest economies in Africa by Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). With a population of about 170 million inhabitants, Nigeria has the largest 
population in Africa and the largest in the black nation. It has recently been acknowledged 
as being Africa’s largest economy and the 26th leading economy in the world with a GDP 
of $510 billion in 2013 (Collier, 2014). Also, based on the GDP, it was ranked the 20th 
largest economy in the world in 2015. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and nominal 
GDP of Nigeria are worth more than $1 trillion and $500 billion respectively. 
 
2.2 Nigeria’s Macroeconomic indicator 
According to the World Bank’s definition, the Gross Domestic Product is the total of the 
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy and any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the product. The economic growth of 
countries is calculated as the percentage change in the GDP from one year to the next. It 
measures whether production has increased, and by how much. The magnitude and 
structure of the growth in  Nigeria’s economy for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 were 







Table 2.1  
Nigeria Macroeconomic indicator 
       2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Population (million)     165 169 174 179 184 
Exchange Rate vs USD (Naira)    156.2 160.0 183.0 199.1 304.7 
Economic Growth (GDP annual variation in %)  4.2 5.5 6.2 2.8 -1.6 
Inflation Rate (CPI annual variation in %)  12.2 8.5 8.1 9 15.7 
Policy Interest Rate in % (Bank Lending Rate)  12 12 13 11 14 
Sources: Focus Economic (www.focus-economics.com/countries/nigeria) 
 
The inflation rate is normally measured by the consumer price index. It reflects the annual 
proportional changes in the cost to the average consumer acquiring a basket of goods and 
services that may be fixed or changed at a specific interval, like yearly (World Bank 
definition). Inflation in Nigeria and other countries is usually calculated as the percentage 
change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from one year to the next. The CPI represents 
the prices paid by the average urban consumer in every various country. Inflation can also 
be calculated with other price indexes, such as the Product Price Index (CPI) or the so-
called GDP deflator. Inflation in Nigeria has continued its downward trend in line with a 
tighter macroeconomic policy since 2011. The rate of CPI inflation remained highest in 
2012 (12.2%) due largely to non-monetary factors, including increases in administrative 
prices, a national strike, and several flooding events in some regions. The CPI inflation fell 






The Bank lending rate is the bank interest rate that usually meets the short-and medium-
term financing needs of the private sectors. Normally, the bank lending rate varies 
according to the creditworthiness of the borrower and the objectives of the financing. The 
terms and conditions attached also differ by countries. The figure on Table 2.1 shows the 
bank lending rates on credits from banks to prime borrowers, i.e., to the lowest risk 
borrowers in the private sectors. 
 
2.2.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate  
One of the important variables normally used as a proxy for macroeconomics by many 
researchers in accounting and finance empirical studies is the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate. This GDP growth rate of the country is very important for the 
effectiveness and appropriate decisions of a firm’s strategic policies and financial decisions 
(Riaz, Bhatti, & Shahab-ud-din, 2014). 
 
The conclusion drawn from the empirical studies was that a country’s economic growth 
influences the firms’ capital structure decisions. As the economy grows, a reduction is 
observed in the expected bankruptcy cost, collateral values of the assets will rise, stock 
prices and free cash flow will also increase, these will affect the firm’s growth and its 
financial choice (Lemma and Negash, 2013). Therefore, when there is an improvement in 
a country’s economic situation, the firms have more potential to have easily available 
external financing so as to satisfy their extra financing choice. These are the basis of the 





financing positively and negatively with leverages as well as retained earnings (Korajczyk, 
Lucas, & McDonald 1992; Choe, Masulis, & Nanda, 1993). 
 
There are many indicators that could represent a country’s economic growth. However, the 
GDP’s growth rate could be a measuring tool of the country’s economic activities. Authors 
like Booth, et al. (2001); Lemma and Negash (2013), etc., have supported the use of the 
GDP for investigating the relationship and the effect of economic growth and decisions on 
a firm’s capital structure. Bokpin (2009) studied the relationship between macroeconomic 
variables and capital structure, and its influence on the firms’ financial choices in 34 
emerging economic countries for a period of 17 years (1990-2006).  
 
The result of the study indicated that GDP relates with debt-to-equity ratio negatively and 
significantly, inflation rate relates to the short-term debt over equity financing positively, 
the development in the stock exchange market is insignificantly related with the capital 
structure of firms and, at the same time, the expectation of skyrocketing rates of bank 
lending can influence the firm to opt for short-term debt over long-term debt and equity 
financing. Riaz, et al. (2014) also used an economic factor model so as to scrutinise the 
impact of macroeconomic elements on the firm’s resolution on capital structure in 
Pakistani firms; the result indicated that the gross domestic product’s growth rate has an 








2.2.2  Bank lending Rate or Interest Rate 
Another important economic factor that influences the capital structure decisions of firms 
is the bank lending rate, otherwise known as interest rate. According to Bokpin (2009), the 
interest rate influences the firm’s capital structure positively and significantly (Bokpin 
2009), but in contrast, Dincergok and Yalciner (2011) argued that the interest rate and 
capital structure are not positively related, and that interest rates primarily affect the firm’s 
capital structure by affecting the debt financing cost, which is the rate of interest lenders 
charge on the borrowed funds.  
 
The common varieties of debt financing available to firms in Nigeria include bank loans, 
debenture, and bonds.  Interest on loans was comparatively associated with a protracted 
fastened legislation. Therefore, once the bank lending rate is higher, firms normally do not 
raise extra funds through bank loans. This is because of the fear of bankruptcy, hence, firms 
think about the bank lending rate before deciding on debt financing. 
 
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2002) argued that the interest rate is inversely associated 
with leverages. Also, Lemma and Negash (2013) declared there was a negative 
relationship, but further argued that if creditor protection rights were stronger, and there 
was a superior quality of law enforcement, it might discourage firms from borrowing funds. 
This is because firms may need to scale back the risks that involve debt. Chen (2010) 
postulated that firms’ issue debt when interest rates are lower, thus they behave like a 
‘market timer’. It has been shown, empirically, that interest rates negatively influence debt 





Rodriguez, 2008). This can be explained by the surveyed behaviours of managers who tend 
to be involved with the issuance of debt for the period when interest rates are at historical 
lows and debt is cheaper (Graham & Harvey 2001). The effect of interest rates on capital 
structure is expected to be related to the changes in inflation because changes in inflation 
determine interest rates (Booth, et al, 2001).     
 
In accordance with the Market Timing Theory, firms’ managers are constantly watching 
the movement of stock markets and only issue securities when the market condition is 
favourable. Thus, by timing favourable markets, the managers can enhance the operational 
performance of the firms. Although there is a cross-industrial dissimilarity in the firms’ 
capital structure decisions, depending upon the country and the sector to which the firms 
belong to, the firm managers must be able to establish the windows of opportunity during 
which the security issuance is less costly. This would contribute towards the enhancement 
of the present operational performance and also towards the future progress of the firms.  
 
2.2.3  Inflation Rate or Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
The inflation rate in the country is another important economic factor that affects the 
resolution of firms on its capital structure. With the persistent increase in the price level of 
different goods and services in the country, the general increase in the cost of a firm’s raw 
materials and other infrastructural amenities, like power and transportation, etc., also 






 Going by the market timing assumption of the capital structure, the firms will use more of 
their leverage when it appears that the rate of interest on the debt is lower than the past rate 
and the future expectation rate. But generally, the prediction about the future interest rate 
depends upon the inflation trend in the economy. Therefore, when there is speculation that 
the inflation rate may rise in the future or that the inflation rate is currently low, firms opt 
for debt financing (Frank and Goyal, 2009). This is in agreement with the market timing 
assumption that postulates that the relationship between the inflation rate and debt ratio 
correlates with the expectation of a future increase in the inflation rate. Dammon and 
Senbet (1988) observed that a higher inflation rate forces investors to sell their bonds in 
exchange for stocks and, therefore, the firms’ debt to equity ratios tend to decrease. The 
general case replica developed by Gulati (1997) to explore the impact of the inflation rate 
on capital structure decisions gives an indication that the inflation rate affects leverage, 
considerably. The empirical study of Booth, et al. (2001) argued that higher inflation rates 
end up reducing   both the total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio in developing countries.  
 
Muntenheri and Green (2002) measured the inflation rate as the proportional changes in 
the consumer price index (CPI). They conducted their study on 52 listed firms in Zimbabwe 
throughout the period of 1990 to1999. The outcome of the study indicated that the inflation 
rate has no appreciable impact on the designing of the capital structure of firms in 
Zimbabwe. In contrast, Riaz, et al. (2014) argued that the inflation rate represents a 
country’s economic growth and is an important economic indicator which is significant 






Nigeria’s economy overtook the South Africa economy in 2014 to become the biggest 
economy in Africa. According to the World Bank Report, Nigeria is classified as an 
emerging market with a mixed economy model, a nation with lower middle-income status, 
a supplier of natural resources in abundance, well-developed communication, 
transportation sectors, and legal, financial and stock exchange markets (The Nigeria Stock 
Exchange).  
 
2.3 The Nigerian Stock Exchange Market 
The stock exchange market in Nigeria, known as The Nigerian Stock Market, was 
established in 1960. It was initially called The Lagos Stock Exchange, and the Stock 
Exchange Council was inaugurated on the 15th of September, 1960. The Lagos Stock 
Exchange began informal operation in June 1961, but it began operations officially on the 
25th of August, 1961 with 19 securities listed for trading. During that time, the initial 
operation of the Lagos Stock Exchange Market was conducted inside the Central Bank 
(CBN) building in Tinubu Square Lagos, with only four (4) firms as market dealers. They 
were: C.T. Bowring, John Holt, ICON (Investment Company of Nigeria), and Inlaks. The 
volume traded by August 1961, was about eighty thousand five hundred pounds (£80,500). 
It later rose to about two hundred fifty thousand pounds (£250,000) in September 1961 
with the majority of the investments in government securities.  
 
The name was changed to The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) in December 1977 by the 
Indigenisation Decree of 1977. Its trading floors were in Kaduna, Port-Harcourt, Kano 





Exchange rose to about 180 firms and with a total capitalisation close to Ten trillion and 
sixteen billion Naira (N10.16tr).  
 
On December 31st, 2015, 172 equities were listed on the NSE, with a total capitalisation of 
$85.3 billion. There were also 15 federal government bonds, 21 corporate bonds, 22 state 
and municipal bonds, 7 exchange-traded products, and two supranational bonds. The firms 
listed on the NSE were in 12 industrial sectors, including agriculture and agro-allied, 
conglomerates, construction, real estate, consumer goods, financial services, healthcare, 
information technology, industrial goods, natural resources, oil and gas, and utilities. This 
research was conducted on all the non-financial firms. 
 
The majority of businesses in Nigeria are not publicly listed, and in terms of numbers, the 
greater percentage is not even registered for many reasons. Some of the reasons are: lack 
of proper education, avoidance of the tax net, and the insignificant nature of the business 
carried out by these business people. Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) estimated that 13.3% of 
the businesses in the country are not publicly listed, and of the registered companies, only 
38% operate in the formal sector. More than 87% of Nigerian businesses carry out their 
operations outside the rules governing the stock market and fail to comply with the 
corporate governance codes and the IFRS (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001). They concluded that 
the compliance with corporate governance codes, like the laws that govern most activities 







2.4  Concept of Corporate Governance  
There is no single definition of corporate governance and certainly no definition that all 
nations agree on (Mayes, Halme, & Liuksila, 2001). Thus, corporate governance can be 
defined and practised in different principles, globally, depending upon the relative power 
of the owners, managers, and providers of capital (Craig, 2005). However, corporate 
governance can be generally described as a procedure, customs, laws, policies, and 
institutions that affect the way a firm is directed, administered or controlled. It can also be 
viewed as the relationships between stakeholders and the goals that are already laid down 
for the firm to follow. The principal stakeholders are shareholders, management, and the 
board of directors. In addition, employees, customers, creditors (banks and bond-holders) 
are also stakeholders. The important objective of corporate governance is to ensure the 
accountability and transparency of those involved in the policy of the firm through 
mechanisms that will reduce the incidence of principal-agent problems. 
 
In terms of corporate governance mechanisms and structure, Keasey and Wright (1993) 
defined corporate governance as a framework for effective monitoring, regulation, and 
control of firms which allows alternative internal and external mechanisms for achieving 
the laid down objectives. The internal mechanisms are the board characteristics, managerial 
ownership, and non-managerial shareholding which involve institutional shareholding and 
blocked shareholding. Meanwhile, the external mechanisms are statutory audit, the market 
for corporate control effectiveness in hostile takeovers, and stock market evaluation of 






However, the advantages of the entire corporate governance framework are determined by 
the interaction amongst these governance mechanisms. Using the Agency Theory 
approach, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance as a process in which 
a supplier of finance to firms assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. The 
authors posited that corporate governance is mainly concerned with the principal-agency 
problem between ownership and control. The authors emphasised that corporate 
governance should be seen as a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect 
themselves against insiders. 
 
Cadbury (2002), also, defined corporate governance as the system by which firms are 
directed and controlled by shareholders. In addition, in terms of the attainment of firm 
goals, objectives, and performance, OECD (1999) viewed corporate governance as a set of 
relationships between the firm’s management, its board, shareholders, and stakeholders. It 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the firm are set and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performances are carried out. 
 
2.5  Enforcement of the Corporate Governance Codes in Nigeria 
According to Ejavbekpokpo and Esuike (2013) and Miko and Kamardin (2016), corporate 
governance in Nigeria is an entirely new concept. Although the Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 2004 (CAMA), Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act of 2002 (BOFIA, 
2002), as amended, Investments and Securities Act of 1999 (ISA, 1999), and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission Act of 1988 (SEC, 1988) included many provisions concerning 





Enforcement is poor in the country where matters are more often than not settled through 
quasi-legal means (Ejavbekpokpo & Esuike, 2013). Many investors are only interested in 
receiving yearly dividends, and because most of them are widely dispersed and of little 
education, the directors are in total control of the affairs of the business, and the annual 
general meetings are usually manipulated in their favour (Toyin, 2017). 
 
The enforcement of compliance with corporate governance codes does not rest with one 
institution in Nigeria. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) supervises the financial 
institutions and ensures compliance. If a bank is quoted on the NSE, the exchange also 
assumes some jurisdiction. Lately, the Inland Federal Revenue Services (IFRS) came on 
board after Nigeria joined other nations in implementing the IFRS. The Financial Reporting 
Council is now claiming to be the preeminent enforcer of these codes. There is a lot of 
confusion regarding which institution the listed firms should be answerable to. 
 
The need to develop and promote good corporate governance in Nigeria has led to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission setting up the Atedo Peterside committee in 2003 
whose report yielded the first comprehensive code of best practices for the public firms in 
Nigeria. This was an attempt to regain the confidence of the public. It explained the role of 
the Board of Directors and management, shareholders’ rights and privileges, and the audit 
committee (Okpara, 2010). 
 
The CAMA 2004 and other company laws provide very limited protection to shareholders 





Commission (SEC), in order to fill this lacuna, inaugurated a national committee in 
September 2008 for the review of the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance for Public 
Companies in Nigeria (C.C.G.C.N). This was to tackle its shortcomings and develop the 
system for its implementation. The committee headed by Mahmoud Abubakar Balarabe, 
SAN (Senior Advocate of Nigeria) was saddled with the following responsibilities: 
 
         i. To identify the weaknesses in the current corporate practices in Nigeria with 
respect to public companies. 
         ii. To examine practices in other jurisdictions with a view to adopting the 
international best practices in the corporate governance in Nigeria. 
         iii. To examine and recommend ways of effecting greater compliance. 
         iv. To identify and advise on other issues that are relevant to promoting good 
corporate governance practices by public companies in Nigeria. 
 
The committee highlighted the shortcomings in the Nigerian corporate governance 
practices as regards public companies after benchmarking with the practices in other 
jurisdictions. Upon submission of its report together with a draft revised Code of Corporate 
Governance, the Securities and Exchange Commission reviewed the draft code, introduced 
some amendments and created the Corporate Governance Code for Public Companies in 
April 2011. The Corporate Governance Code 2011 focused on board responsibilities and 
composition, CEO duality, procedures and frequency of meetings, requirements for non-
executive directors, compensation of the members of the board, and financial reporting and 





The Corporate Governance Code 2011 issued by the SEC, was fashioned after the OECD 
principles of corporate governance, and also stipulated the rights and responsibilities of 
shareholders; audit committees’ duties and responsibilities, qualifications, and meetings; 
and the size, diversity, experience, and independence of the board of directors. 
 
 Afolabi (2015) stated that the reason why corporate governance is ineffective in Nigeria 
could be traced to a wholesale adoption of the British company’s law of 1948 by the 
Nigerian legislatures. According to him, the adoption was done without considering the 
peculiar history and business environment in Nigeria, the country’s level and stage of 
development. The failure of Nigeria’s businesses is traceable to other factors than just 
corporate governance weaknesses, though a poor control system is a significant contributor 
to corporate collapses in the country. 
  
2.6 Concept of Capital Structure 
Several definitions of the capital structure were given by different scholars and researchers. 
Amongst those definitions is the one given by Haugen and Senbet (1988), who defined the 
capital structure as a choice of firm between internal and external sources of financing. 
Schlosser (1989) also defined the capital structure as the ratio of total debt to the total 
capital of a firm. Another definition is from Brealey and Myers (1991), they defined the 
capital structure as a composition of the total debt, total equity or hybrid securities issued 






Bos and Fetherson (1993) described capital structure as the ratio of total debt to the total 
asset at book value that influences both riskiness and profitability of the firm. Pandey 
(2004) concluded that, the firm capital structure is the ratio of the total debt and total equity 
financing of the firms. From the definitions above, it can be concluded that the firm’s 
capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total asset that a firm uses to finance its 
operations. Some scholars also referred to it as firms’ leverage.  
 
The use of fixed-charge sources of funds alongside equity in the capital structure is termed 
as financial leverage (Pandey, 2004).  It could also be referred to as the leverage of a firm 
or the proportional relationship or ratios between the company’s debt and equity. A firm 
that has a capital structure with a lot of debt is referred to as a highly leveraged firm, whilst 
those without debt financing are called unleveraged firms. Myers (2001) proved that, the 
study of capital structure basically attempts to describe the mixture of stock and other 
sources of finance that the firm uses in its operations. Thus, studies on capital structure 
normally focus on the ratio of debt to equity which is disclosed in the yearly financial 
statement of the firms.  
 
Equity capital refers to funds generated or raised from investors, generally shareholders, 
by the process of the sale of shares/stocks, and one of the advantages of using equity 
financing is that, there is no need to repay the funds, as the understanding of the 
shareholders when they purchase stock is that they own a little stake within the business, 
then it is the obligation of the firm to generate consistent profits so as to keep up a healthy 





Debt capital refers to funds acquired through borrowing and later to be repaid. There are 
various types of debt, but the most common types of debt capital include debentures and 
bonds, preference shares, and bank loans. Amongst the benefits of debt capital is that it 
allows the firm to leverage little funds to a bigger one which enables speedy development 
that might otherwise be impossible. Another advantage of debt capital is that interest 
payment rates are typically tax-free, meaning that even if the interest rate increases, the 
cost will be partially offset by the reduction in taxable operational income of the firm. 
However, the disadvantage of debt capital financing is that the lender needs the payment 
of interest, meaning that the overall quantity to be repaid will exceed the initial amount. 
Also, regardless of the firm’s revenue, the payment on the debt obligation must be made; 
these may be too risky especially for newer or smaller firms. 
 
According to Brigham and Daves (2004), all firms need operating capital to perform their 
business. Hence, to acquire that operating capital, they usually have to increase the funds 
by the combination of debt and equity. Accordingly, the trick for each investment is to find 
the best mix of both. If a company has too much debt, it may overextend its ability to 
service the debt and can be vulnerable to business downturns and changes in interest rates, 
and thus, would be viewed to be financially risky. On the other hand, too much equity 
dilutes ownership interest, exposes the firm to outside control, and usually indicates that 
the business is not effectively using its cash to obtain business assets. This may be 






Firms establish target capital structures that are considered optimal for business. Though 
actual levels of debt and equity may fluctuate over time, firms usually attempt to keep their 
financing mix close to their target. Daves, et al. (2004) were of the opinion that managers 
should choose the capital structure that maximises the shareholders’ wealth. The 
fundamental approach is to consider a trial capital structure, based on the market values of 
debt and equity, then estimate the value of the shareholders under this capital structure. 
 
2.7. Underpinning Theory: Agency Theory  
Corporate governance has traditionally been associated with the “principal-agent” or 
“agency” paradox. A “principal-agent” relationship arises when the person who owns a 
firm is not the same as the person who manages or controls it. The agency debate traces its 
roots from the publication of Berle and Means (1932) in which they noted that the 
separation of ownership and control gives managers the opportunity to pursue their 
interests the against owners’ interests. It was later developed by Jensen and Meckling in 
their 1976 publication. Jensen and Meckling (1976) established that the consequence of the 
separation of ownership and control is the agency problem as the managers may not act in 
the interests of their principal, accordingly, because the interests of both parties may not 
be aligned. Jensen and Meckling in their publication described an agency as a contract 
under which one or more persons, called principals, and employs another person (agent) to 
perform some duties on their behalf which involves deputation of some higher operational 
right to the agent. They further emphasised that, provided both parties to the relationship 
are utility maximisers, there is good evidence to assume that the agent will not always act 





 The results of this agency problem is an agency cost, which is the cost of this separation 
(ownership and control).  
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), Agency cost is the aggregate of the monitoring 
costs by the owner, the residual loss also by the owner and the bonding cost by the manager. 
Monitoring costs refer to those expenses paid to observe, control, and also measure the 
agent’s activities which are normally paid for by the owner. However, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argued that those expenses will be ultimately borne by the manager as their 
compensation will be, eventually, adjusted to cover those expenses. The agent is likely to 
established structures that will see them acting in the best interest of the owner, the costs 
of setting up such structures and adhering to them are what Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
refer to as bonding costs, which are borne by the agent. Moreover, monitoring and bonding 
costs are not likely to fully align the interests of the owners and the agent; there is still the 
possibility of having agency losses arising from these conflicts of interest which are 
referred to as residual losses. The result of this is to enforce a contractual mechanisms 
designed to mitigate this agency problem. 
 
To mitigate the agency problems, various methods have been suggested. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggested either to increase the ownership of the managers in the firm in 
order to align the interests of the managers with that of the owners. Or increase the use of 
debt, which might motivate the managers to increase their performances to avoid this risk 
of losing their jobs due to the higher probability of bankruptcy.  Jensen (1986) suggested 





amongst the shareholders instead of wasting it on inefficient activities. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) suggested that the use of debt increases the chances of bankruptcy and job loss 
which further motivate managers to use the organizational resources efficiently and reduce 
their consumption. 
 
The consequence that has risen from the corporate governance mechanisms was the role of 
the monitoring mechanisms that will persuade the managers to perform in order to meet 
the owners’ interests and objectives. The monitoring mechanisms of the agency theory 
assumption is that the agency problem will be reduced and the manager will be mandated 
to opt for low debt so as to reduce firm risk and to protect their investments. Various 
monitoring mechanisms have been suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in reducing 
the agency problem. Amongst which are monitoring within the firm which relates to board 
structure, monitoring outside the firm which relates to ownership and the monitoring 
mechanisms’ role in the government regulation and policy. For the purpose of this study, 
board structure and ownership structure have been used in representing the monitoring 
mechanisms, whilst choice of external auditor has been used in representing the mechanism 
related to regulation and policy.  
 
Corporate governance deals with the relationship between stakeholders and the goals that 
are already laid down, such as the leverages level for the firm to follow. The conflict of 
interest arising from this relationship is what the agency theory is all about, this 
substantially serves as the basis for the adoption of the agency theory as the underpinning 





2.8 The Theories of Capital Structure 
There are other theories that explain the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, firm characteristics, and capital structure in the literature of accounting and 
finance. Prominent amongst these theories of capital structure are also considered in this 
study as supporting theories. The theories are: Modigliani and Miller’s Capital Structure 
Model (1963), Pecking Order, Trade-Off, and Market Timing Theories.  
 
2.8.1 Modigliani and Miller’s Capital Structure model (1963) 
Modigliani and Miller introduced the Relevancy/Irrelevance model of capital structure in 
1958. They formulated the proposition that a firm could not change the value of its 
outstanding securities by changing the ratio of its capital structure element, and that the 
value of the firm and its total cost of its capital were irrelevant to its alternative of capital 
structure.  
 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller conducted another empirical study and this time introduced 
taxes into their earlier model. This led to the increase in market value of the firm and 
reduction in the total cost of capital (Mostafa & Boregowda, 2014). This implied that their 
earlier model of 1958 was planned under excellent and perfect capital market conditions, 
thus the value of any firm is independent of its financing decision. However, those 
assumptions could not hold in the real world, but by the time those assumptions were 
relaxed, the capital structure decision became an important factor that determines the value 
of a firm (Sheikh and Wang, 2010). Modigliani and Miller’s Relevancy/Irrelevance model 





of those assumptions could hold up in reality (Danso & Adomako, 2014). These challenges 
led to the development of several capital structure theories by different scholars and 
researchers.  
 
2.8.2. The Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure 
The pecking order theory is an old theory in the area of capital structure theory 
development and descriptive literature. The theory was originally developed by Donaldson 
in 1961 in an attempt to explain the financing behaviour of management. It was, however, 
articulated clearly by Myers and Majluf (1984) where they proposed three sources of funds: 
retained earnings, debt, and equity, as the available firm financing sources in order of their 
priority. The theory advocated that firms should prioritise their financing sources from 
internal sources to external equity. Thus, the pecking order theory postulated that a firm 
make its financial choice following the priority sequence from retained earnings (internally 
generated income) to debt financing, and then equity financing. 
 
The rationale for this prioritisation of the financing sources from retained earnings to debt 
to equity, was that internal funds were thought to be the cheapest and there is no outsider 
interference. Picking external debt as the next option is because it is cheaper and it has very 
few limitations compared to the issuance of new equity financing. This Pecking Order 
theory, according to Mostafa and Boregowda (2014), is contrary to the Trade-off theory 







2.8.3  The Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure 
The trade-off is assumed to be the most prominent and oldest theory, the original version 
came into being after the Modigliani-Miller’s proposition in 1963. Kraus and Litzenberger 
(1973) provided a classical version of the theory that, optimal leverage reflects a trade-off 
between the tax benefits of debt and bankruptcy costs. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
stated that in a complete and perfect capital market, the firms’ market values are 
independent of their capital structures. However, they also stated that the taxation of 
corporate profits and the existence of bankruptcy penalties are market imperfections which 
stand central in proving the effect of debt on the firms’ market values (Kraus & 
Litzenberger, 1973).  According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), the theory primarily 
describes the importance of debt with the existence of bankruptcy costs and taxes. The 
theory also explains that the firm capital structure is the outcome of the trade-off between 
the debt benefit and its cost (Abor, 2007). The trade-off theory postulates that firms are 
expected to select a target capital structure that will maximise the firm value and 
bankruptcy cost (Sheikh, & Wang, 2010). 
 
It was also argued by Awan and Amin (2014) that the Trade-off theory assumes that each 
source of finance has its own costs and returns. And all these are related to the firm’s 
earning capability, business operation, and bankruptcy risks. Thus, a firm with a higher tax 
benefit will opt for higher debt financing, and with that, the bankruptcy costs and benefits 
from the tax shield are balanced. The Trade-off theory has proved that the optimal capital 





and the costs of issuing the debt (Jaahanzeb, Rehman, Bajuri, Karami, & 
Ahmadimousaabad, 2014). 
 
2.8.4 Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), the market timing theory is not a new idea in 
empirical and academic literature, it is rather a relatively old idea; but, it was renewed and 
gained popularity recently. Lucas McDonald (1990) designed a model called the Dynamic 
Adverse Selection model. This model combines those principles of the Pecking Order 
theory with the Market Timing idea. It has been this model that has clearly articulated the 
Market Timing theory.  
 
Basically, the Market Timing theory postulates that, before making the selection between 
debt and equity financing, a manager examines the current condition in the stock market, 
and prefers whichever option currently looks very favourable, or defers the issuances of 
equity if neither options look favourable. Firms may even raise funds despite there being 
no need for it currently, if they have observed that the market conditions seem unusually 
favourable.  
 
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) explained in their research that, the issuance of 
equity by the managers following an increase in the stock price of the firm is a market 
timing idea. The Market Timing theory places more emphasis on the prevailing economy 
condition, though some of those factors traditionally considered in capital structure studies 





conditions, stock returns, or bank lending rates and economy conditions are the main 
factors that play a vital role in the capital structure decision.  
 
2.9  Empirical Studies on Corporate Governance and Capital Structure  
It is generally accepted that corporate governance could play a vital role in the choice of 
finance that maximises the shareholders’ wealth of a firm. Wen, et al. (2002) found a 
relationship between corporate governance and capital structure by analysing the data of 
Chinese listed firms. The study revealed that, due to strict rules and regulations, the 
managers of the Chinese firms did not employ debt to keep the risk of default at a low 
level. The study also revealed that the managers tended to pursue lower financial leverage 
when they were facing strong corporate governance from the board. However, their finding 
only showed a significant value of board composition and CEO’s tenure and insignificant 
results for board size and fixed CEO’s compensation. 
 
Suto (2003) described the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure 
before and after the financial crises, using the Agency Cost approach. The study analysed 
the time series and cross-sectional data obtained from the KLSE, by using different proxy 
variables for capital structure and corporate governance. The result showed that the 
commitment in banks for lending and borrowing caused an increase in the debt ratio. On 
the other hand, an increase in ownership did not affect corporate management. Further, the 
study revealed that foreign ownership reduced the agency cost, and also, a high debt ratio 






Otnet (2006) conducted a study on the relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure in Jordan firms using ownership structure as a proxy for corporate 
governance. The result indicated that the agency cost rose due to the internal and external 
set of corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure, and it could have 
positive or negative impacts on the capital structure. Anegative relation between ownership 
structure and capital structure, on one hand, is due to short-term financing. And, a positive 
relationship between ownership structure and capital structure, on the other hand, is due to 
sustainability in financing and enforcement of block holders’ ownership to avail 
themselves of the opportunity of a high debt.  
 
Abor & Biekpe (2006) examined the relationship between corporate governance (board 
size, board composition, board skill, and the CEO duality) and the capital structure of 
Ghanaian Small and Medium Enterprises using multivariate regression analysis. The 
results indicated a negative relationship between board size and capital structure decisions. 
Abor (2007), in his study on how corporate governance affects capital structure, found that 
there was a significantly negative relationship between board size and capital structure. 
The study established an opposite result on the association between CEO duality and 
leverage, where it implied that larger boards adopt low debt policies and the CEO as the 
board’s chairman tended to employ a high proportion of debt. He arrived at this conclusion 
after analysing data collected from 22 firms listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) 






Another study carried out by La Bruslerie and Latrous (2007) revealed that the relationship 
between ownership structure and leverage varies according to the level of the controlling 
shareholders’ equity ownership. They found that debt in terms of leverage was used by 
controlling shareholders to protect themselves from unnecessary takeovers.  Antoniou, et 
al. (2008) conducted a study to investigate how firms operating in capital market-oriented 
economies (the U.K. & the U.S.) and determine their capital structures, using multi-
variance analysis. They found that the capital structure of a firm is heavily influenced by 
the corporate governance practices and exposure to capital markets.  
 
Hussainy and Aljifri (2012) examined the relationship between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate capital structure. They divided these mechanisms into two types 
of internal and external mechanisms. The sample consisted of 71 companies, using multiple 
regressions. The results of this study indicated that institutional investors on the debt to 
equity ratio had a negative impact. Also, they found that there were positive relationships 
between the dividend policy and debt to equity ratio. Other findings showed that company 
size had a positive relationship with the debt to equity ratio. 
 
Rehman, et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between the board size and the capital 
structure of 19 randomly selected banks in Pakistan from 2005-2006. Panel multiple 
regressions for analysis was used. They found a positive relationship between board size 
and capital structure. Saad (2010) used a sample of 126 Malaysian publically listed 
companies from four industries (consumer products, industrial products, trading/services, 





results show a positive relationship between board size and capital structure and a negative 
relationship between duality and capital structure. 
 
Bodaghi and Ahmadpour (2010) collected data from 50 Iranian firms listed on the Tehran 
Stock Exchange to test the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure. 
They found a negative relationship between board size and debt to equity ratio. They found 
that CEO duality did not significantly influence corporate financing behaviour. Guo, Ding, 
and Sun (2010) investigated the effect of ownership concentration on leverage levels. They 
used 365 companies from 1997 to 2009. Panel multiple regression was used for the data 
analysis. Their research findings confirmed a negative effect of ownership concentration 
on leverage. 
  
In general, Spanos (2005) noted that corporate governance has a vital implication for the 
economic growth of a nation. This means that to attract more investors into the economy 
and reduce business risk, there should be an effective and efficient corporate governance 
practice. There are differences in the economic, social, regulatory, and even business 
environments in different countries, and from one firm to another. Thus, the corporate 
governance impact on firms also differs (Rouf, 2011). This is also applicable to capital 
structure’s influence on the firm’s value. The capital structure’s impact also differs as a 
result of the dissimilarity in the tax brackets and the companies, rules, and regulations of 
different countries. The relation between the two phenomena was actually analysed 
intensively in a developed economy, but such analysis is very scantily available in 





Corporate governance mechanisms of firms can be seen as principal mechanisms that can 
influence the firms’ capital structures. Hence, the main focus of this section is a review of 
related literature in terms of some studies that have been conducted to investigate and 
explain what influence corporate governance mechanisms have on capital structure 
decisions. Going by the monitoring role played by the board and ownership structure, and 
the availability of data in the Nigerian firms’ annual reports, the corporate governance 
mechanism variables used in this study include: board size, board meetings, board 
independence, block-holder ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, 
and external audit (Big 4 audit firms). Conversely, the capital structure proxy was debt 
ratio and it was defined as the total debt to total equity plus total debt. However, total equity 
plus total debt represented the total assets of the firms. 
 
 2.9.1  Board Size and Capital Structure 
The apex body in a firm that is responsible and accountable for managing the firm and its 
overall operation is the board of directors. It plays a vital role in strategic decision making 
concerning the financial mixture. Therefore, the overall affairs of the firm is the board of 
directors’ responsibilities. Designing the firm’s strategic aims and objectives and 
effectively managing the firm’s financial and human resources towards attaining those 
aims and objectives is the function of the board of directors (SEC Code, 2011, 2(1)). 
 
No rule specifies the membership size of firm’s board of directors. The membership size 
depends on the service and the complexity of the firm’s activities. Its composition must, 





the freedom and integrity of individual board members to attend the meetings. However, a 
minimum of five (5) members is required by law (SEC Code, 2011, 4(1) & 4(2)).    
 
The study carried out by Pfeff and Salancik (1978) proved that a significant association 
exists between board size and capital structure, but the direction of the association is mixed 
and not clear yet.  A study like Abor and Biekpe’s (2005) found a negative relationship 
between the board size and debt ratios in Ghanaian SMEs, adding that larger board SMEs 
were usually associated with lower debt levels. Also, the influence of the ownership 
structure and corporate governance in Pakistani listed firms was examined by Hassan and 
Butt (2009). The result indicated that managerial ownership and board size are both 
significantly inversely related to the debt to equity ratio. Heng and Azrbaijani (2012) 
conducted an empirical study in Malaysia on how board size can influence a firm’s 
leverage. They found a negative association between the size of the board and debt to asset 
ratio.  
 
Recently, Shafana (2016) conducted a study of the board of directors’ characteristics and 
influence on the capital structure decisions of non-financial listed firms in Sri Lanka. The 
result indicated that all the tested board of directors’ characteristics, including board size, 
did not have any significant relationship with the capital structure decisions.   
 
Contrary to the above findings, some other researchers reported a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between board size and capital structure decisions. Some of the 





et al. (2004). The general argument was that larger board firms were more likely to use 
debt financing than smaller board firms. The same result was also found by Jiraporn, Kim, 
and Kitsabunnarat (2009) and Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2009). Also, Ganiyu and Abiodun 
(2012) conducted a study on the influence of board of directors’ characteristics in 
determining the capital structures of food and beverage firms in Nigeria, and they declared 
that they were related significantly. Another recent study is that of Agyei and Owusu 
(2014) who conducted research in listed manufacturing firms in Ghana on the association 
between board size and capital structure decisions. The result shows that they are positively 
related. However, all the empirical results above depict the importance of board size 
amongst the corporate governance mechanisms in the capital structure mix practices, and 
how it influences the capital structure decisions in various firms and countries. 
 
2.9.2  Board Meetings and Capital Structure 
The provision of Section 12, Sub-sections 1 and 2 of the SEC Code (2011) mandates the 
firms’ board of directors to arrange and preside over meetings at least on a quarterly basis 
so as to deliberate on the firms’ issues. It says: 
To effectively perform its oversight function and monitor management              
performance, the board should meet at least once every quarter, (Minimum 
of 4 meetings within 12 months).  
Every director should be required to attend at least two-thirds of all board 
meetings (SEC Code, 2011, 12(1 & 2)).  
 
In these meetings, the directors are expected to discuss every important issue concerning 
the firm and in addition, the performance of the board members should be assessed also. 
Limited studies have investigated the relationship between board meetings and capital 





at least once every quarter indicates the importance of board meetings in corporate 
governance mechanisms. This has motivated the researcher to include board meetings 
amongst the board structure variables that influence capital structure decisions. 
 
Empirical research has also analysed the importance of the frequency of the board meetings 
for effective governance purposes. More frequent meetings would improve the ability of 
the board of directors to monitor and advise managers (Mudalige & Athula, 2015). 
Rajendran (2012) found a positive relationship between the number of board meetings and 
leadership style and the leverage of the firm. Vafeas (2000) also revealed that an increase 
in board meeting frequency is followed by improvement in the operating performance. 
 
2.9.3  Board Independence and Capital Structure 
Board independence signifies that the majority of the members of the firm’s board of 
directors are non-executives. The SEC Code (2011) states that a board be comprised of 
executive and non-executive directors. This means that for any board to be independent, 
the majority of the directors must be independent or non-executive directors. 
 
The code emphasises that the board of directors’ composition is a vital component of the 
corporate governance policy. Thus, the capital structure decisions of the firm can be 
influenced by the proportion of non-executive and independent directors on the firms’ 
boards of directors. The principle of the SEC code 2011, section 4(3) states that “the board 





and the majority of the board members should be non-executive directors, and at least one 
of whom should be an independent director”.  
 
According to Ajanthan (2013), he argued that, to prevent an individual or a group of people 
from dominating the board’s decision making, there should be a balance of executive and 
non-executive directors in the firm’s board of directors. One can also refer to the study of 
Wen, et al. (2012) and Kajananthan (2012) where they commented that a higher degree of 
external directors can influence the capital structure decision of the firm. They argued 
further that, a higher proportion of outside directors has the propensity to monitor managers 
more actively. The higher the proportion of outside directors, the lower the debt ratio and 
the higher the level of equity financing; this was the concluding argument of Wen, et al. 
(2002) from the result of their study. In contrast, Kajanthan (2012) argued that a higher 
percentage of outside directors utilise higher debt than equity. 
 
Some other studies have also produced mixed results on the direction of the relationship 
between board independence and capital structure. Jensen (1986); Berger, et al. (1997); 
and Abor (2007), in their studies, postulated that the higher the proportion of outside 
directors, the higher the debt ratio and the lower the level of equity financing. Abor and 
Biekpe (2007) were also in support of this argument. However, it can be concluded that 
there is a relationship between the board composition and the capital structure decisions of 







2.9.4 Block Holders Ownership and Capital Structure  
Ownership concentration controls the agency cost between the principal and the agent by 
creating an incentive for and monitoring capacity of the block holder. Heinrich (2002) 
argued that changing the risk sensitivity of the investors, ownership concentration 
internalises monitoring and controls the free rider problem. According to La, Porta, and 
Lopez-de-Silanes (1999), concentrated ownership could be induced by reasons like the 
substantial legal and financial benefits of control, dominant shareholders' capacity to 
monitor the managers better, and to counteract the poor legal protection available to small 
investors. Bolton, Becht, and Roell (2005) opined that partial ownership concentration and 
firm control by a few large investors solve the collective action problem of the 
shareholders. As the stake of the shareholders in the firm increases so does the incentive to 
engage more in the firm’s affairs. Consequently, shareholders become more watchfulof 
management activities and try to protect their cash flow, in the right way.  
 
Salma (2009) studied the impact of ownership concentration and capital structure 
adjustment. The study was on the capital structure dynamics of a panel of 766 firms from 
five Western European countries using multiple panel regression analysis. Large block 
shareholder was used as a measurement of the ownership concentration. The result 
indicated that transaction costs and the agency costs inherent to ownership concentration 
are a significant determinant of capital structure dynamics.  
 
Driffield, Mahambare, and Pal (2007) carried out a study on the impact of ownership 





investigated the effect of ownership structure on both capital structure and firm 
performance. Large block shareholder was used as a measurement of ownership 
concentration, and on the other hand, they used earnings variability to measure leverage. 
Their findings failed to produce any conclusive evidence on the relationship between 
ownership concentration, capital structure, and firm value as the results varied between the 
firms in the sample countries due to the differences in the legal and corporate governance 
practices. 
 
Driffield and Mohambare (2007) carried out a study to find the relationship between 
ownership concentration and capital structure in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Their 
findings confirmed that there is a significantly positive relationship between leverage and 
ownership concentration. Thus, they proved that the ownership concentration may be an 
effective supervisory mechanism. They also opined that a higher ownership concentration 
has a positive impact on capital structure and firm value. In the case of a lower ownership 
concentration, the relationship depends upon the strictness of the managerial decision 
making, which is enforced to bring change in the capital structure.  
 
Cespedes, Gonzales, and Molina (2008) studied the relationship between the ownership 
concentration and capital structure variables in seven countries of Latin America from 1996 
to 2005, using multiple regression techniques. The findings showed the positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and leverage. Also, they gained a positive 
relationship between leverage and corporate growth.  Hassan and Butt (2009) examined 





on the capital structure and firm value in listed non-financial firms in the Australian Stock 
Exchange from 1993 to 2008. The findings showed that there is a positive significant 
relationship between ownership concentration with firm value, ownership concentration 
with leverage, and leverage with firm value.  
 
2.9.5  Managerial Ownership and Capital Structure 
According to Brailsford, Olive, and Pua (2002), it is not only the firm’s characteristics or 
situational factors that influence the firm’s capital structure decisions, but also the 
managerial ownership structure.  The general argument of Bokpin and Arko (2009) was 
that, the major concern of the firm managers is to retain or even increase their control in 
the business, therefore, a higher proportion of managerial shareholding will result in higher 
debt financing for the managers to avoid equity rights dilution. This argument was also 
supported by Nadeem, et al. (2012) that, managers opt for debt financing in order to 
reinforce their control and avoid the risk of take overs. 
  
The higher the proportion of managerial shareholding in the firm, the higher the debt 
financing (Bokpin & Arko 2009), whilst those firms with a lower proportion of managerial 
shareholding may opt for more equity financing. Several empirical studies found a positive 
and significant relationship between the proportion of managerial shareholding and debt to 
equity ratio, (Stulz 1990; Jiraporn & Liu 2008; Bokpin & Arko 2009; Nadeem. et al. 2012; 
and Agyei & Owusu 2014) with the basic principle that managers increase the firms’ debt 






Another study, wattanakantang (1999), which was conducted in Thailand and is 
consistence with the ones conducted in Ghana by Bokpin and Arko (2009) and Agyei and 
Owusu (2014), revealed that managerial ownership is significantly positively related to 
capital structure decisions. 
 
2.9.6 Institutional Ownership and Capital Structure  
Typical institutional shareholders, such as pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies, corporate firms, and banks, have the capacity to monitor and affect investment 
strategies to their own benefits. They play key roles in promoting the stakeholders’ interests 
and engagement in their invested firms (Armour, Deakin, & Konzelmann, 2003). Lakshmi 
(2009) argued that institutional shareholders can reduce the agency costs by monitoring the 
corporate performance and by ensuring the shareholders’ interests. Also, Lev (1988) 
opined that the institutional shareholders are well informed compared with individual 
shareholders. This type of shareholder has easy access to different sources of information 
thereby playing a significant role in the firm’s capital structure decisions. The close 
monitoring of institutional shareholders may force managers to make decisions in the 
interest of the shareholders. Their ability to pursue self-interests can be reduced, and as a 
result, the managers may be hindered from employing lower levels of debt to protect their 
employment risk.  
 
Lakshmi (2009) was of the view that close monitoring of institutional shareholders may 
force managers to make decisions in the interest of the shareholders, and their ability to 





employing lower levels of debt to protect their employment risk. Also, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) showed that institutional shareholders successfully monitor the performance of the 
management team of the firm because of their positions. Their huge stake in the firm 
provides the economics for an effective monitoring policy. Shome and Singh (1995) also 
produced evidence that supports the argument.  
 
In contrast, Pound (1988) challenged the argument. He claimed that large external 
shareholders may be passive voters. They may collude with insiders against the interests 
of the dispersed shareholders. In line with this argument, McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
presented the passive voters hypothesis by relating the large shareholders with firm value. 
If this happens to be the behaviour of institutional investors, then institutional shareholding 
and debt level may be negatively related to each other. Crutchleyl, Jensen, Jahera, and 
Raymond (1999) provided evidence that the association between institutional shareholders 
and the debt-to-equity ratio is positive and statistically significant. Their empirical study 
also shows that institutional shareholding and firm debt level are related. They opined that 
institutional ownership may be related to capital structure. They found that institutional 
ownership is simultaneously determined with leverage. 
 
2.9.7  External Auditor and Capital Structure  
A lot of theoretical literature has long proved that the availability of unbalanced 
information between the outside investors and the firms will have effects on the firms’ 
financial decisions. There are very few empirical studies that have investigated the 





available empirical studies is that of Myers and Majluf (1984), which proved how the 
adverse selection of the external auditor can lead firms to ignore the use of equity financing 
and forgo profitable investments. 
 
Idrisi (2013) explained that, information asymmetry happens in a situation where one party 
of a firm has more and precise information about the firm’s policies, operations, and 
performance than another party. One of the primary objectives of corporate governance 
mechanisms is to reduce asymmetric information. An audited financial statement is an 
important tool for reducing information asymmetries and maintaining an efficient market 
environment, and this can be achieved with a high quality audit. Audit quality contributes 
to the credibility of the firm’s financial statement disclosure, and to that extent, investors 
will be willing to contract with the firm thereby reducing the cost of the capital (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). However, audit quality that could eventually affect the cost of the capital 
depends on the selection of the external auditor (Abbott & Parker, 2000). Chang, Dasgupta, 
and Hilary (2009) argued that, the debt ratios of firms are reduced in response to favourable 
capital market conditions when the firms’ financial statements are audited by credible 
external auditors. 
 
The audit quality provided by an industry-specialised auditor is better than the audit quality 
provided by the non-industry specialised auditor (Abbott & Parker, 2000). This means that 
all external auditor may not provide the same level of audit service.  The services of 
industry-specialised external auditors are more expensive, and the best representation for 





2002), they are audit firms that are usually thought to provide a higher level of audit quality. 
The Big 4 audit firms are the four largest auditing firms in the world. They used to be 
known as the Big 8 before 1989. The Big 8 firms were: Arthur Andersen; Arthur Yong & 
Co.; Coopers & Lybrand; Ernst & Whinney; Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells; KPMG; Touched 
Ross; and lastly, Price Waterhouse. In 1989, Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Yong 
& Co. and formed Ernst & Young; and Deloitte, Haskins, & Sells merged with Touched 
Ross and formed Deloitte Touched and they were since then refer to as the Big 6.  
 
In 1998, Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers & Lybrand to form Price Waterhouse 
Cooper thereby reducing their status to the Big 5. But, the fall of Arthur Andersen in 2002 
led to their present status as the Big 4 with Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler popularly 
known as KPMG remaining unchanged. These audit firms are now referred to as the Big 
4. They are big, have the resources to supply auditors with industrial specialists rather than 
the non-Big 4 auditors, and also, they have more incentive to perform high-quality audits. 
According to Chang, et al. (2009), auditor quality influences the financial decisions of 
firms, because their dual roles of providing quality information and insurance matter to 
capital market participants.   
 
According to Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004), previous research on the auditor 
characteristics explained that auditors provide two valuable roles in the capital market: an 
information role and an insurance role. Investors often use audited financial statements as 
the basis for their investment decisions (Mansi, et al., 2004), therefore, the choice of the 





mechanism. Nanyang and Dasgupta (2009) found that firms that select Big 4 audit firms 
are likely to opt for more equity financing than those that select non-Big 4 audit firms, and 
those firms are able to build larger equity financing than those audited by smaller audit 
firms. 
 
Khaled (2009) also argued that investors are able to better anticipate future earnings when 
the financial statement of the firm is audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms. Al-Hiyari, 
Abdul Latif, and Amran, (2016) explained how the benefits of goodwill rises in those firms 
in which their financial statements were audited by the Big 4 auditors. Overall, it can be 
concluded that, consistent with the dual roles of providing quality assurance and 
information played by external auditors, this, in turn, is valued by lenders and investors 
and eventually influences the firms’ capital structures. 
 
2.10 Review of Empirical Studies on Firms’ specific characteristics  
Several empirical studies have examined the firms’ and industries’ specific characteristics 
and capital structure decisions. Researchers, such as Odedokun (1995), Olatundun (2002), 
Eboh (2004), Salawu (2007a), Kajola (2008), Adesola (2009), Ezeoha and Francis (2010),  
and Shehu (2011) carried out works which relate to the determinants of Capital Structure 
in Nigeria and their findings did not agree on the common attributes in the capital structure 
of the Nigerian firms.  
 
A number of firm-level characteristics have been identified by researchers as firm 





characteristics include; firm age, profitability, size of the firm, asset structure, firm risk, 
growth, and taxation. Others are: firm’s location entrepreneur’s educational background 
and gender, the form of business and expert status of the firm. It is worthwhile to investigate 
the influence of firm characteristics on capital structure in domains like developing 
countries. This would provide answers to questions such as; is there are differences in the 
predictability of determinants of capital structure between developed and developing 
economies? 
 
Olowoniyi, Akinleye, and Afolabi (2012) investigated the determinants of capital structure 
of listed firms in Nigeria. The study employed Panel Econometric approach to analyse 
panel data obtained from 70 listed firms for the period 2000 to 2009. Their findings suggest 
that expected growth and size influence stock return positively while tangibility has a 
negative influence on the capital structure of listed firms.  
 
Also, Shehu (2011) investigated the determinants of capital structure in Nigerian listed 
insurance firms between 2001 and 2010. The analysis were performed using panel data 
pertaining to 15 insurance firms obtained from the annual report of the sampled firms, 
using multiple regressions as a tool of analysis. The entire result reveals that leverage is 
negatively correlated with firm’s size and age while profitability and tangibility are 
positively correlated with leverage. However, a negative relationship between Growth 
opportunity and leverage was found, a study conducted by Garba (2010), where they 
examined the determinants of capital structure from a sample of Nigerian companies in the 





the independent variables, which include profitability, size, tangibility and firm growth 
have a significant negative relationship with leverage. 
 
 Little attention is paid to some studies carried out in Nigeria that focussed on the 
relationship between local corporate ownership and capital structure decision. Iwarere and 
Akinleye (2010), David and Olorunfemi (2010), Ezeoha and Francis (2010) worked in this 
area. There have been several studies on capital structure focusing on various regions and 
countries. This section addresses such studies on firm’s size, firm’s age and firm’s growth, 
so as to provide an insight into the various trends on the subject. 
 
2.10.1  Firm’s Size 
One of the variables that are considered very important determinant of capital structure is 
the firm’s size. Among other reasons given is that bigger firms are usually spread out in 
term of operations, thus their tendency to liquidation is very low (Rajan & Zingales, 2005). 
Abiodun (2014) also viewed firm’s size as a variable that has the quality to determine a 
firm’s capital structure, researcher frequently use it as a control variable in corporate 
finance study.   
 
Previous empirical studies have provided sufficient evidence that there is a notable and 
positive association between the firm’s size and capital structure resolution. Some of these 
studies include: Friend and Lang (1988); Barclay and Smith (1996); Barton, Ned and 
Sundaram (1989); Mackie-Mason (1990); Kim and Sorensen (1986); Al-Sakran (2001); 





worked on the relationship between firm’s size and capital structure; Daskalakis and 
Psillaki (2008); Heyman, Deloof and Ooghe, (2008); Tarus, Nehemiah, and Geoffrey 
(2014) and Chechet, Ishaya and Olayiwola (2014). Most of these scholars believed that 
bigger firms normally use debt financing while those smaller ones probably tend to use the 
equity in their financing.  
 
Al-Sakran (2001); Hovakimian et al. (2004) and Ogbulu and Emeni (2012) found a positive 
relationship between firm’s size and the capital structure decision. Hassan (2011) also 
argued that firm’s size has a sufficient quality to determine the capital structure of listed 
insurance firms in Nigeria. However, as expressed in Abor (2008), a contrary association 
exist between firm’s size and short-term debt ratio in the studies of Caesar and Holmes 
(2003), Esperanca, Ana and Mohammed (2003) and Hall, Hutchinson and Michaelas 
(2004).   
 
Also, Phillips and Sipahioğlu (2004) and Tang and Jang (2007) in their studies on 
publicly listed firms in U.K. and USA., respectively could not find evidence of the 
relationship between the debt ratio and firm’s size. Similarly, Karadeniz, Kandir, Balcilar, 
and Onal, (2009) in their study in Turkish listed firms reported that firm’s size and capital 
structure don't appear to be related. 
 
2.10.2  Firm’s Age 
Another variable that is considered very important determinant of capital structure is the 





theoretically, the connection between the firm’s capital structure decision and the age of 
the firm is still not clear. How long a firm is in its operation means the firm’s age. This 
factor determines the firm’s reputation and this is gathered from what they undergo over 
the years which resulted in goodwill. As firms function for over a long period, it manifests 
and strengthens itself as an on-going concern. This builds the chances of the firm to opt for 
more debts. It can, therefore, be argued that the relationship between firm age and capital 
structure decision is materially positive. 
 
Previous empirical studies have provided sufficient evidence that there is a remarkable 
positive association between the age of the firms and the designing of its capital structure 
(Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Hall, et al., 2004; Abor, 2008; Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, 2010; 
Ezeoha & Botha 2012; Chechet & Olayiwola, 2014; Ahmad & Aris, 2015). The general 
point of their studies is that it agreed with the trade-off and agency cost assumption which 
predicted that firm’s age relate with debt to equity ratio positively. Older firms have better 
access to debt financing since they have established a good relationship with the lenders 
who keep the track of the firm’s financial record and reputation to be a positive record, as 
it is contained in most of the above empirical studies.   
 
2.10.3  Firm’s Growth 
Another variable that is considered a very important element that influences the capital 
structure is the firm’s growth. Studies like Myers (1977) postulated that, if firms are 
anticipating future growth, they possibly opt for higher equity financing base on the 





leverage ratio.  Marsh (1982) in his own argument stated that, the vision of the firm for 
future expansion needs additional financial obligation to the internal reserve of the firm 
thereby forcing the firm to source for external debt. He concluded that if a firm is highly 
anticipating future expansion, they will opt for relatively higher debt ratios. Furthermore, 
Hall et al., (2004) argued that growth is probably going to force a higher request on firm’s 
internal reserves thereby leading to demand external debt. Zeitun and Tian (2007) also, 
argued in support of this that possibility for firm’s growth can have a vital impact on the 
determinant of firm’s potential and that firm with potentialities for growth are able to create 
more from investment opportunity.   
 
Previous experimental investigation on the association between firm’s growth and the 
firm’s capital structure is mixed and indecisive. A positive relationship was reported in 
some studies like: Kester, (1986); Titman and Wesses, (1988); Chechet and Olayiwola 
(2014); and Ahmad and Aris (2015).Whilst other studies argued that firms with higher 
expansion rate use little debt financing. Some of the studies in support of this inverse 
relationship argument include: Kim and Sorensen (1986); Stulz (1990); Rajan and Zingales 
(1995); Roden and Lewellen (1995) and Al-Sakran (2001).  
 
2.11 Control variables: Macroeconomic variables and Capital Structure 
Several empirical studies have been carried out to find out what the factors are that 
influence a firm’s capital structure. Nonetheless, in the majority of the studies, they offer 
consideration solely to firm-specific characteristics and only a paucity of the studies 





Elliott, Koëter-Kant, & Warr, 2008; and Huang & Ritter, 2009). However, some have 
shown that the country’s fiscal policy and the macroeconomic factors play a vital role in 
the firm’s capital structure decisions (Booth, et al, 2001; Deesomsak, Paudyal, & Pesce, 
2004; Bancel & Mitto, 2004; Harkbarth, Miao, & Morellec, 2006; Muthama, et al., 2013; 
and Anila Çekrezi, 2013). Perera and Gunadeera (2015) established that macroeconomic 
factors influence the direction and the size of firm capital structure; thus, due consideration 
needs to be given to the state of the business environment as well.  
 
Booth, et al, (2001) argued that an increase in inflation forces lenders to sell bonds in 
exchange for stock, thereby leading to a reduction in the total and long-term debt ratios, 
particularly in emerging economies. Riaz, et al. (2014) documented that the GDP growth 
rate of the country is very important for effective and sustainable decision making on firm 
capital structure policies. Booth, et al. (2001) argued that, there is likely to be an increase 
in the stock prices during the economic growth which may lead the firms to opt for a lower 
debt ratio. Abzari, Fathi, and Nematizadeh (2012) documented that the GDP growth rate 
that states the overall economy of the country, interest rate which is measured by the prime 
lending rate, and the inflation rate are vital macroeconomic factors that have significant 
influence over the firms’ financial choice. 
 
Ajao and Ema (2013), in a study on the determinants of the capital structure in Nigerian 
firms, discovered some country-specific factors, such as cultural setting, development of 
capital markets, monetary policies, political risk, and fiscal policies, as major determinants 





considered carefully in determining the capital structure of a firm.  Korajeczyk and Levy 
(2003) also argued that a firm’s decision on the source of finance can be influenced by 
firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic factors as a firm issues more securities 
during favourable macroeconomic conditions. Antoniou, et al, (2002) noted that it is not 
the firm’s specific characteristics alone that exclusively influence the decisions on capital 
structure, the close business environment and the economic situation also influence 
decisions on capital structure.  
 
From previous empirical studies, it has been observed that the Market Timing Theory 
(MTT) is the one related more to the capital structure decisions of firms with the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions (Huang & Ritter, 2009; Bougatef & Chichit, 2010; and Khanna, 
Srivastava, & Medury, 2014). Furthermore, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Frank and 
Goyal (2009) based their arguments on the theory, stressing that decisions on capital 
structure are dependent on the type of market that appears to be more favourable. 
According to them, the fund-raising could be suspended, if neither of the market conditions 
appears favourable or could even raise funds, though not presently needed, if the market 
conditions appear unusually favourable. The ability of the firms’ managers to time the 
market conditions so as to raise capital cheaply is emphasised in the MTT.  
 
From the study conducted by Graham and Harvey (2001), the sample of the Chief 
Executive Officers admitted that they studied the stock market conditions before making 
the selection of the financing option; and also, the market timing theory played a crucial 





(2015) also argued that the firms, considerably, time the market conditions, and at the same 
time, strengthen their level characteristics. Therefore, the fluctuations in macroeconomic 
factors have a direct relationship with capital structure and they can influence the decision, 
significantly, either in the short-run or in the long-run (Khanna, Srivastava, & Medury 
2015).  
 
Thus, this section of the research has concentrated on the relationship that exists between 
some macroeconomic variables and the capital structure decisions of the firms in the 
context of Nigeria’s economy. It has explored how macroeconomic conditions influence a 
firm’s capital structure decisions by invoking a select set of macroeconomic variables. The 
variable selected were: the Growth Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, Inflation rate, 
and Bank Lending rate, largely based on the capital structure literature and data availability. 
 
2.12 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature in relation to the corporate governance mechanisms 
and firms’ specific characteristics on the capital structure decisions in the developed and 
developing economies. Also, it explained some macroeconomic indicators as control 
variables. It identified the dearth of empirical studies in highly volatile and debt-financing 
environments, such as Nigeria, where the stock markets are resilient to volatility in the 
environment and with many firms with high debt ratios. This chapter also reviewed the 
theories that are relevant to corporate governance, firm characteristics, and capital 
structure. Lastly, this literature review has been used to design the conceptual framework 








3.0 Brief Research Methodology 
This research work has explored the influence of the corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics on the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria. Thus, the panel data regression analysis was applied since the study was to 
examine the time variance effects across firms.  
 
The population for this study consisted of one hundred and six (106) firms out of the total 
one hundred and fifteen (115) non-financial listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) over a five-year period (5-years) (2012-2016). Financial firms were excluded 
because their capital structures are exogenously determined by the monetary regulatory 
authorities with no reference to the investment, operational, or fiscal considerations of 
these financial institutions. Furthermore, the accounting information disclosed and the 
nature of services rendered by the financial institutions are quite different from the other 
sectors. The total number of non-financial listed firms in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) was 115, however, a total of nine (9) firms that did not have complete records or 
were not in existence between 1st January 2012 and 31st December 2016 were excluded. 
Therefore, the total number of one hundred and six (106) non-financial listed firms was 






The information regarding the individual firm’s corporate governance mechanisms, firm-
specific characteristics, and their capital structures was obtained through the firms’ annual 
reports, the Nigerian Stock Exchange fact book, and the handbook of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. Whilst the macroeconomic information was obtained through the annual reports 
of the Central Bank of Nigeria and other global economy reports. 
Table 3.1  
Sample selection procedure; Summary (106 Firms 2012 -2016) 




(firm X 5) 
Firms Listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange 2012-2016 
Less 
Finance, Insurance and Investment Firms 
Non-financial listed firms 
Less 
Firms delisted or newly listed between 2012- 2016 
Firms with unavailable data on corporate governance and Financial statement 

















Final observation  530 
 
Table 3.2  
List of sectors under non-financial firms 
Non-Financial Sectors    Number of  Number of             Number of  
Sample firms Excluded firms            firms 
Agriculture Sector     5  0  5 
Conglomerates Sector     5  1  6 
Construction/Real Estate Sector    7  1  8 
Consumer Goods Sector     20  2  22 
Healthcare Sector     9  2  11 
Industrial Goods Sector     16  0  16 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) Sector  6  1  7 
Natural Resources Sector     4  0  4 
Oil and Gas Sector     11  1  12 
Services Sector      23  1  24 
Total        106  9  115 
 
In addition to the above, core data sources like the National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria, 
previous related empirical studies, and books were the important documents that were 
referred to by the researcher to make the study robust.  A pure quantitative set of secondary 





package with suitable statistical and econometric tools for investigating the association 
between the two groups of independent variables: corporate governance mechanism 
variables and firm-specific characteristics, on capital structure decisions. 
 
 3.1 Structural Framework 
This study conceptualised that the capital structure level (debt ratio) is a function of the 
corporate governance mechanisms and the firm-specific characteristics. The following 
structural framework, therefore, depicts the relationship between debt ratio, corporate 
governance mechanisms, and firm-specific characteristics. Capital structure was 
recognised as the dependent variable in this study, whilst corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm-specific characteristics were considered as the independent 
variables. According to Green, et al. (2002), micro and macro policy issues influence firms’ 
capital structure decisions; thus, macroeconomic variables were considered as the control 
variables so as to determine the influence of macroeconomic issues on the firms’ capital 
structures. 
 
The proxies used for the corporate governance mechanisms were: board size, board 
meetings, board independence, block holder ownership, managerial ownership, and 
institution ownership, whilst the choice of Big 4 external audit firms were used as a  proxy 
for the external corporate governance mechanisms. The proxies used for firm 
characteristics were: firm age, firm size, and firm growth. In the capital structure, the debt 





perspective (Jensen, 1986; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). For the purpose of this study, capital 
structure was tagged as debt ratio and it was defined as follows: 
 
DR = TDR = Total Debt / Total Debt + Total Equity (Total Asset)   (1a) 
 
Where ‘DR’ (Debt ratio) represented the total debt ratio (TDR), which was used as the 
proxy of the capital structure in the main analysis of this study. Total debt was the addition 
of items listed in the non-current and current liabilities’ sections of the listed firm’s 
financial statement, and the addition of the total debt and total equity represented the total 
assets of the firm. 
 
Moreover, for the robust analysis, the debt ratio was viewed from two other debt ratios- 
the long-term debt ratio (LTDR) and short-term debt ratio (STDR), and a comparison was 
made between the results obtained from 1a, 1b, & 1c. Long-term debt included items listed 
in the non-current liabilities’ section of the listed firm’s financial statement. Whilst short-
term debt included items in the current liabilities.  
 
DR2 = LTDR = Long-Term Debt / Total Debt + Total Equity    (1b) 
DR3 = STDR = Short-Term Debt /   Total Debt + Total Equity    (1c) 
 
The reason for investigating the other two debt ratios, was to examine whether corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm characteristics would have different influences on 





the listed firms in Nigeria. Previous research, including Echekoba and Ananwude (2016), 
has shown that Nigerian firms relied more on short-term debt than long-term debt, whilst 
some did not use long-term debt at all. According to Bevan and Danbolt (2002), the 
analysis of capital structure is incomplete without a detailed examination of all forms of 
the firm’s total debt, because the determinant of the debt ratio depends upon which 
component of debt is being analysed (Bevan & Danbolt 2002). Long-term and short-term 
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3.2 Hypotheses Development 
In spite of the consequential role of corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ capital 
structure decisions, evidence from the available experimental investigation in not really 
convincing in regards to how the corporate governance procedures influence the capital 
structure decisions of firms. And, at the same time, it was noticed that corporate governance 
practices in each country are different from each other depending on the economy and 
culture that shape the corporate governance procedures. In addition, corporate governance 
practices vary, not only across countries, but also across firms and industry sectors. Despite 
that, there is a paucity of empirical investigations that have studied the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ capital structure decisions in developing 
economy countries like Nigeria. This section provides the hypotheses associated with the 
corporate governance mechanisms, firm-specific characteristics (independent variables), 
and capital structure decisions (dependent variable).  
 
Generally, the concept of corporate governance practices is built around the association 
between the owners (principal) and the management (agent) of the firm. And the agency 
theory suggests that ownership and board structure could be used to mollify the conflict of 
interests between agents and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1986) suggested 
that debt could be used as a controlling device to motivate managers to distribute free cash 
amongst shareholders instead of wasting it on inefficient activities. Grossman and Hart 
(1982) suggested that the use of debt increases the chances of bankruptcy and job loss 
which further motivates managers to use the organisational resources efficiently and reduce 





capital structure, especially when management is pressurised by the shareholders to use 
funds efficiently so as to be able to meet-up with future cash flows. The agency theory 
suggests that there are several ways in which debt can help mollify the agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986). For instance, the introduction of 
convertible bonds into the existing capital structure gives the bondholders the right to 
covert debts into equity under some conditions, and this conversion right reduces the 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. Shareholders also promote debt 
financing so as to use debt to restrict the free cash flow available in the firm (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Corporate governance determines the firm’s organisational structure, and different 
corporate governance mechanisms play different functions in the corporate governance. 
These different functions influence the firm’s financing choice and affect the level of debt 
and equity that the firm will prefer (Shi, 2010). Therefore, a firm’s capital structure 
decision depends on the board and ownership structure that actually control the firm 
(Pindado & La Torre, 2011). These control and monitoring mechanisms result in agency 
costs, and the agency costs are endured entirely by the equity shareholders (Rashid & Islam 
2013; Baulkaran, 2014; and Kay & Vojtech, 2016).  
 
The relationships between the corporate governance mechanisms and the capital structure 
have been hypothesised in this study by following the agency theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), which indicates that there are significant relationships 
between the corporate governance mechanisms and the firms’ capital structure policies. 





board structure (board size, board meetings, and board independence), ownership structure 
(block holder ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership), and external 
auditors (Big 4 audit firms). The decision was based on Nigeria’s context as an emerging 
economy with distinct corporate governance practices and data limitations.  
 
3.2.1  Board Size 
 Board size is the number of directors that constitute the board of directors of the firms who 
are managing the activities of the firms and making strategic financial decisions. Previous 
accounting and finance research has established that there is a link between the number of 
directors on the board and the firm’s capital structure decision (see for example, Bodaghi 
& Ahmadpour, 2010; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Ganiyu & Abiodun, 2012; Heng & 
Azrbaijani, 2012; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; and Shafana, 2016). However, the empirical 
results from these various studies on the degree and direction of their relationship were 
mixed. 
 
According to Jensen (1993), the board size is inversely related to the board’s ability to 
recommend and participate in long-term planning, because of the burdensome relation with 
organising and coordinating a higher number of directors. Berger, et al. (1997); Abor and 
Bikpie (2006); Abor (2007); and Hassan and Butt (2009), contended that firms with a 
higher number of  board memberships prefer low debt levels, and that larger boards might 
emphasise the owner-manager to use a lot of equity financing so as to enhance firm 
performance. The implication was that a higher number of board directors might exert 





strengthen firm performance. Therefore, firms with larger board size are inclined to use a 
lower proportion of debt in their capital structures.  
 
Heng and Azrbaijani (2012) investigated how board size relates to firm leverage and found 
out that, the relationship between the number of board members and debt to asset ratio is 
inverse. Bodaghi and Ahmadpour (2010) examined the relationship between leverage and 
board size in Tehran firms, and established that an inversed relationship existed between 
leverage and board size. However, Shafana (2016) argued that board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality have no remarkable impact on the firm’s capital structure 
decision. 
 
Adams and Mehran (2002) maintained that some firms need a large number of board 
members for powerful supervision. Sheikh and Wang (2012) studied firms in Pakistan and 
found that the board size was positively associated with the firms’ debt ratios. Hussainey 
and Aljifri (2012) conducted a study in the United Arab Emirate and found that the board 
size was related to the debt ratio, positively. Ganiyu and Abiodun (2012) conducted 
experimental research on the listed firm in Nigeria and established a positive relationship 
between the board size and capital structure, and also suggested that a board with a large 
number of members can easily apply effective monitoring and control over the firm’s 
operation. 
   
The agency theory’s assumption postulates that the principal and agent relationship 





board memberships may prefer low debt so as to reduce firm risk and to protect their 
investments, whilst a small number of board members may use debt as a substitute 
mechanism to reduce the agency cost (Berger, et al., 1997). Based on the agency theory 
assumption that a larger board size prefers monitoring control mechanisms rather than debt 
control mechanisms, leading to a lower debt ratio, this study hypothesised that: 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between board size and debt ratio.   
 
3.2.2 Board Meetings 
Several empirical studies have been carried out on corporate governance practices and firm 
performance, however, very few studies focus on the impact of board meetings on capital 
structure. The financing and capital structures designed by firms are based on the board of 
directors’ decisions, and in compliance with the corporate governance code of best 
practices. Saad (2010) examined the level of compliance amongst the listed firms in 
Malaysia with the implementation of the corporate governance code of best practices in 
Malaysia and reported a significant negative relationship between the board meetings and 
capital structure. 
 
On the contrary, Shafana (2016) studied the influence of the board of directors’ 
characteristics on the capital structure decisions of the profitable non-financial firms in Sri 
Lanka. He argued that board meetings had a significant and positive impact on the capital 
structure decisions; whereas, the number of directors, number of independent directors, and 
CEO duality did not have any appreciable impact on the capital structure decisions. 





average board meeting attendance and debt ratio. They argued that with frequent board 
meetings and a high attendance of directors, the firm has the ability to use monitoring 
mechanisms to monitor the operations of the firm, and lenders will not hesitate to provide 
debt to such a firm.  
 
The board meeting is an element of the corporate governance mechanisms in controlling 
and monitoring the firm’s operation, which according to the agency theory has influence 
on the firm’s choice of financing. Higher Frequencies of board meetings are an indication 
that the board prefers the monitoring control mechanisms rather than the debt control 
mechanisms thereby reducing the debt ratio. Thus, this study hypothesised that: 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the board meetings and the debt 
ratio. 
 
3.2.3 Board Independence 
Board independence is another factor that has been given more attention by researchers 
and policymakers. Board independence is the percentage of independent and non-executive 
directors (outside directors) serving on the firm’s board of directors. Wen, et al., (2002) 
predicted the existence of a significant negative association between the debt ratio and the 
representation of non-executive directors on the firm’s board of directors. They argued that 
non-executive directors monitor the managers more effectively and efficiently, thus forcing 






In contrast, Awan, Rashid, and Zia-ur-Rehman (2011) investigated the association between 
the board independence and the capital structure of the listed manufacturing firms on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange and Lahore Stock Exchange for the Textile sector and found a 
significant positive relationship. Similarly, Ajanthan (2013) and Rehman, et al. (2010) 
found a positive association between board composition and debt ratio. Berger, et al. (1997) 
hypothesised that a board with more independent directors monitors the managers more 
actively, thus making the managers adopt more debt financing. The scholars’ arguments 
prove the significant relationship between board independence and capital structure, and 
the principal-agent relationship of the agency theory assumption that, agents (managers) 
face vigorous monitoring when the principal (board of directors) is controlled by 
independent directors. The agency theory postulates that a higher percentage of 
independent directors on the board will have a negative influence on the firm’s leverages, 
therefore, this study hypothesised that: 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between board independence and the debt 
ratio. 
 
3.2.4 Block Holder Ownership 
Block holder ownership refers to the equity shareholders ownership of at least five per cent 
(5%) of a firm’s equity shares (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 2002; Fosberg, 2004; Farouk & 
Luka, 2013; Agyei & Owusu, 2014; Miko, & Kamardin, 2015b; and Abobakar & Elgiziry, 
2016). Block holder ownership is a situation where one or a few of the equity holders 
control a minimum of 5 per cent of the equity shareholdings (Abobakr, & Elgiziry, 2016; 





block holder ownership was measured as the percentage of equity shares held by a large 
number of shareholders who held a minimum of 5% of the outstanding equity of the firm.  
Block holder ownership may help to mitigate the agency problems between the 
shareholders and the managers (Nadeem & Sheikh, 2012) as empirical studies revealed a 
significant relationship between block holder ownership and debt ratio. 
 
The relationship between block holder ownership and capital structure is still mixed to 
some extent. Many empirical studies (Brailsford, et al., 2002; Abobakr, & Elgiziry, 2016; 
and Okafor, et al., 2016) agreed that large investors may have motivation and influence for 
controlling and monitoring the firm’s management, which affects the capital structure 
decision. Thus, this makes it difficult for the managers to adjust the debt level for their own 
interests. Block shareholding may help to reduce the agency cost problem because of the 
opportunism level of the agent (managers) that will, accordingly, lead to a reduction of the 
conflicts between the principal and the agent (Abobakr, & Elgiziry, 2016).  
 
Berger, et al. (1997) found that the debt ratio increased when there was an increase in block 
holder ownership. Brailsford, et al. (2002) argued that as block holder equity rights 
increase, their voting power and influence also increases, giving block holder owners the 
motivation to control the actions of the managers, thus the firms’ debt ratios are likely to 
be on the increase. Therefore, the debt ratio can be expected to be more when firms have 






Chidambaran and John (2000) argued that ownership concentration plays a significant role 
in conveying information on firm activities to other shareholders. Fosberg (2004) proposed 
that managers are obliged to use more debt when an influential monitor exists, thus firms 
with large investors use debt more than firms without such investors. Consequently, the 
debt ratio is expected to be higher in firms with higher ownership concentrations. 
On the contrary, Pound (1988) argued that block holders may be passive voters who 
conspire with managers against the interests of the dispersed equity holders. The block 
holder ownership may be negatively related with the firm debt ratio in that situation 
(Pound, 1988). 
 
The agency theory has established that block ownership leads to efficient monitoring of the 
management at a lower cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). And efficient monitoring may 
cause the managers to lower the debt ratio; thus, managers seek lower leverage when faced 
with stronger monitoring. Therefore, this study hypothesised that: 
H4: There is a significant negative relationship between block holder ownership and the 
debt ratio.   
 
3.2.5 Managerial Ownership  
Empirical research has found mixed results concerning the linkage between managerial 
ownership and capital structure. Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Bokpin and Arko (2009) 
established a negligible association between managerial ownership and capital structure, 
whereas some other research investigations have established 





structure. Bathala, Moon, and Rao (1994) and Zou and Xiao (2006) declared that there is 
a negative association between managerial ownership and capital structure. They argued 
that a firm with a high proportion of debt ratio faces bankruptcy risk, therefore, equity 
financing will be more attractive for the managers to maintain their interests and positions. 
This is an indication that managers seek to avoid debt, but it is contrary to Stulz’s (1988) 
theory that managers use leverage to inflate the voting power of their equity. 
 
According to Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002), an organisation with higher managerial 
ownership has more debt capital financing than firms with lower managerial ownership. 
Bokpin and Arko (2009) revealed that the managerial ownership had a significant positive 
relationship with the long-term debt ratio in Ghana firms. They confirmed that an 
expansion in the debt ratios assisted the managers to strengthen their control and prevent 
takeovers, and with higher debt ratios, the managers could have additional funds to achieve 
their own interests.  
 
Mehran (1992) also proclaimed a favourable linkage between managerial ownership and 
capital structure suggesting that ownership in firms causes the managers to expand the firm 
debt financing. Berger, et al. (1997) declared a notably positive association between debt 
financing and managerial ownership indicating that managers whose monetary benefits are 
associated with external shareholders can adopt more debt financing to boost the value of 
the firm. More recently, Le (2015) also established a positive and significant association 





Brailsford, et al. (2002) argued that the linkage between managerial ownership and capital 
can be nonlinear. If the managerial ownership decreases, the agency dispute will decrease, 
leading to a higher debt ratio. However, Brailsford, et al. (2002) argued further that, if the 
management already holds an appreciable ownership of the firms’ equity, then an 
expansion in managerial ownership can result in a lot of managerial opportunism, and it 
will generate a lower debt.  Jensen and Meckling (1976), in using the agency theory, argued 
that, managers may prefer less debt, because of their desire to reduce firm risk and to 
protect their diverged human capitals. Empirical studies have proved the existence of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and debt ratio. Thus, this study hypothesised 
that: 
H5: There is a significant negative relationship between managerial ownership and the 
debt ratio.    
 
3.2.6 Institutional Ownership  
Institutional ownership refers to the institutional investor. Some of these institutional 
investors are stock mutual funds, pension funds, and corporate firms that control substantial 
equity rights in a firm (Al-Najjar & Taylor 2008). There are empirical studies that show 
that institutional ownership and firm capital structure are related, however, the empirical 
results on their relationship with debt ratio have been mixed. (Al-Najjar and Taylor, 2008; 
Bodaghi and Ahmadpour, 2010; and Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012). 
 
 Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) argued that, institutional shareholders have a better 





agency costs. Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) revealed a significant positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and debt ratio in their study. Arguing further that 
institutional investors have a strong influence on supervising the firm’s managers thereby 
reducing agency problems. In consistency with this, Abdoli, Lashkary, and Dehghani 
(2012) also found a positive relationship. They argued that institutional investors have easy 
access to different sources of debt financing, such as loans or bonds. A similar proposition 
was made by Michaely and Vincent (2012) who reported that higher institutional 
shareholders may lead to improved shareholder rights and stronger shareholder influence. 
This, in turn, will enable investors to mandate management to introduce more debt in order 
to lower management discretion. 
 
On the contrary, Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) detected a significant negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and debt ratio. This indicates that, firms that have more of 
their equity shares held by institutional investors employ less debt financing. The agency 
theory postulates that an optimal debt ratio and ownership structure can minimise agency 
costs, the theory also suggests that, firms with high debt ratios signal that the firms are 
facing a future of financial distress as reported by Hussainey and Aljifri (2012). Therefore, 
institutional shareholders may prefer firms with lower debt ratios thereby using monitoring 
mechanisms. The monitoring mechanisms of the agency theory’s assumption is that the 
agency problem will be reduced and the manager will be mandated to opt for low debt so 






H6: There is a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership and the 
debt ratio.        
 
3.2.7 Big 4 Audit Firms 
Empirical evidence that links the influence of the external auditor choice on the firm’s 
capital structure is limited, however, the external auditor choice is very important in 
determining the audit quality, and this will, eventually, influence the cost of the capital 
(Abbott & Parker, 2000).  Chang, et al. (2009) documented that, auditor quality is relevant 
to the firms’ capital structure decisions. Chang, et al. (2009) argued further that, firms with 
Big 4 auditors have less debt ratio and higher equity ratio relative to the debt ratio compared 
with firms not using Big 4 auditors. Also, one of the key capital structure determinants for 
firms operating in a financially constrained business environment is the external auditing 
quality (Ojo, 2011). According to Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004), the literature on 
auditor characteristics disclosed that external auditors provide information and insurance 
roles to capital market participants, which contributes to the credibility of the financial 
information. However, there is a paucity of empirical evidence that relates the external 
auditor choice and the firms’ capital structure decisions. 
 
In relation to the pecking order theory, many theoretical and empirical studies have agreed 
that the pecking order theory is based on information asymmetries, and based on this 
information asymmetry, firms use a specific order when it comes to financing choice, but 
normally prefer debt to equity financing (Kennedy, 2013). Bharath, et al., (2009) used a 





considered as one of the determinants of firm capital structure decisions. They proved that 
asymmetric information has propelled the capital structure decisions of the United State of 
America’s firms. In turn, external auditors play a key role in assuring the integrity of the 
information. Khaled (2009) proved that when the financial statement of a firm is audited 
by Big 4 audit firms, the level of the firm’s asymmetric information between the firm and 
the investor is decreased; thus, the investor can foresee subsequent earnings in the stock 
exchange market.  Abbott and Parker (2000) declared in their investigation that the industry 
specialist auditor’s results yielded better audit quality than the non-industry specialist 
auditor,  and the best illustration for auditors with industry specialists is the Big four 
auditors.  
 
Al-Hiyari, et al. (2016), confirmed this argument by maintaining that Big 4 audit firms 
render higher audit standards than other smaller audit firms, meaning that Big 4 audit firms 
normally provide a higher degree of standard audits related to the high audit fees. This 
higher audit fee implies that the audit quality ought to decrease the agency conflicts 
between the firm manager and the outside investors, thus having influence on the firm’s 
capital structure decision. Chang, et al. (2009) postulated that, the auditor quality affects 
the financing decisions of the firms, and that higher audit quality reduces the impact of 
market conditions on the client’s capital structure.  
 
Chang, et al. (2009) argued that auditor quality is sort of vital for the progress of the firm, 
and the selection of auditor quality is absolutely essential to the success of the firm’s 





statements and decreasing unbalanced information. They proved that firms audited by Big 
4 auditors are able to make large equity shares which result in a low debt in the capital 
structure. They found that firms audited by Big 4 firms have less debt in their capital 
structure. Using the agency theory assumption of monitoring mechanisms, this study, 
hypothesised that: 
H7: There is a significant negative relation between Big 4 audit firms and the debt ratio. 
 
3.2.8  Firm’s Size 
Friend and Lang (1988) studied the impact of managerial self-interest on a firm’s capital 
structure and found that larger firms have better access to debt; they are able to employ 
more debt financing as compared with smaller firms. Their argument is also supported by 
Shivdasani and Zenner (2005), where they argued that larger firms are more diversified 
and are less exposed to bankruptcy. 
 
Several empirical studies confirm that the relationship between a firm’s size and capital 
structure is a significant positive relationship,(studies such as, Barclay & Smith, 1996; 
Friend & Lang, 1988; Barton, et al., 1989; Mackie-Mason, 1990; Kim, Mauer, & Sherman 
1998; Al-Sakran, 2001; and Hovakimian, et al., 2004 as contained in Abor, 2008). These 
studies concluded that larger firms tend to use more debt whilst smaller ones are more 
likely to use more equity, in their respective capital structures. 
 
The relationship between firm size and capital structure can be viewed from the asymmetric 





perspectives. The pecking order theory postulates that, the debt ratio will increase when 
the investment exceeds the internal source, and decrease when the investment is lower than 
the internal source (Carmen, Joseph, & Benjamin 2011). This indicates that investment size 
influences debt ratio. Similarly, the trade-off theory assumes that, financing deficit or 
surplus is the main channel that firms normally use to adjust their debt ratio (Carmen, et 
al, 2011). Empirical studies also demonstrate the existence of a relationship between firm 
size and capital structure. Based on the pecking order assumption, this study, therefore, 
hypothesised that: 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between the Firm’s size and the debt ratio.        
 
3.2.9  Firm’s Age 
The age of a firm can be assumed as a proxy for experience, and an older firm should be 
able to withstand, better, a critical economic problem than a new firm. In this study, the 
age of the firm was measured as the number of years since its incorporation. The theoretical 
relationship between a firm’s age and the capital structure decision has been argued by 
many scholars (Dewaelheyns, et al., 2010; Ezeoha & Botha, 2012; Chechet & Olayiwola, 
2014; and Ahmad & Aris, 2015). The pecking order theory postulates that the use of debt 
financing is reduced with the age of the firm. The argument is that, firms are able to build 
up a significant amount of retained earnings as they grow older in the business, indicating 
a negative relationship between firm age and debt ratio (Ahmad & Aris 2015).  Ahmad and 
Aris (2015), in their study, reported a significant negative relationship between firm age 





On the contrary, the trade-off and agency theories postulate a positive relationship between 
firm age and debt ratio (Varun, 2014). The assumption is that, firms that have been in 
business for a longer period have better access to debt financing. The empirical studies by 
Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2010); Ezeoha and Botha (2012); and Chechet and Olayiwola 
(2014) tend to support the trade-off and agency theories. They discovered a significant 
positive relationship between a firm’s age and the capital structure. They supported the 
argument that older firms in the industry have better access to debt financing because they 
have established a relationship with lenders who keep track of their financial records and 
reputations. On that basis, both the theoretical and empirical arguments provide that there 
is a relationship between firm age and debt ratio. Using the trade-off assumption that older 
firms have better access to debt financing, this study, therefore, hypothesised that: 
H9: There is a significant positive relationship between the firm’s age and the debt ratio.        
 
3.2.10  Firm’s Growth 
 
Frank and Goyal (2005) argued that a firm’s growth is a major firm-specific factor that can 
influence a firm’s financial choice. The pecking order theory predicts a positive 
relationship between a firm’s growth with its debt ratio, implying that firms with more 
growth opportunities are more likely to become more leveraged over-time (Frank and 
Goyal, 2005). According to some recent empirical research, including Amanuel (2011); 
Solomon (2012); Tornyeva (2013); and Muhammad, Ahmad, Ahmad, Noraini, and Melati 
(2013), the growth opportunities of a firm are found to have a positive impact on firm 





percentage change in total assets. This follows the assumption of some research work, 
including Solomon (2012) and Muhammad, et al. (2013). 
 
The theoretical and empirical results on the relationship between firm growth and capital 
structure are contentious. Booth, et al. (2001) argued that a firm's growth opportunities will 
lead to higher agency costs of debt, which indicates an inverse relationship between the 
two. As for the agency cost as argued by Myers (1977), it was postulated that financing 
profitable investments in a growing firm can be controlled by issuing short-term debts that 
mature before the growth options are exercised. The theoretical assumption is that firms 
whose assets have a higher proportion of growth use short-term debt. Frank and Goyal 
(2005) assumed that growing firms are relatively young and thus, have scarce internal 
funds available to finance their operation opportunities, therefore, they are highly 
dependent on external debt as postulated by the pecking order theory. Consistent with the 
pecking order theory that, a growing firm is an indication of an increase in investment 
opportunities thereby predicting a positive relationship between a firm’s growths with its 
debt ratio. Thus, this study hypothesised that: 
H10: There is a significant positive relationship between a firm’s growth and the debt ratio.        
 
3.3 Variable Measurements 
Many different empirical measurements of debt ratio have been used. Some scholars 
advocate book leverage, whilst some support market leverage. For the purpose of this 
study, the book option was used based on the argument of Myers (1977), Graham and 





leverage because debt is better supported by assets in place than it is by growth 
opportunities. Graham and Harvey (2001) were of the opinion that a large number of 
managers do not rebalance their capital structures in response to equity market movements 
due to the presence of adjustment costs. Olowe (2011) preferred book leverage because 
financial markets fluctuate and managers are said to believe that market leverage numbers 
are unreliable as a guide to corporate financial policies. 
  
In presenting the results, the main focus of the dependent variable was on the book debt 
ratio (i.e., the ratio of the total debt to the total debt plus total equity). However, the 
measurement of the independent and control variables are indicated in Table 3.1 as being 
supported by different scholars cited in the reference column. 
 















Table 3.3.  
Variables definition and measurement 








Debt ratio  TDR       Total debt / Total Debt 
+Total equity                                                      
Ajanthan (2013); 




































































































































































The number of directors 




The number of board 





Dividing number of 
independent and non-
executive directors by 
total number of board of 
directors 
 
Measured by the 
percentage of the 
shareholding by block 
shareholders with 5% 
minimum of equity 
ownership 
 
Managerial Ownership is 
measured as the 
percentage of ordinary 
shares held by executive 
directors as shown in the 
annual report) 
 
Institutional ownership is 
measured by the 
percentage of total 
number of shares held by 
institutions such as 
pension funds, mutual 
funds, insurance 
companies, corporate 
firms and banks to total 
number of shares 
 
Ajanthan (2013); 




Saad (2010); Security 
and Exchange Com. 










Abobakr & Elgiziry 






Brailsford, et al., 
(2002); Farouk & 





Michaely & Vincent 
(2012); Shehu et al., 
(2011); Hamze, 










Table 3.3. (Continued) 
 
3.4 Techniques of the Data Analysis 
This study used the panel multiple regression technique of data analysis in testing and 
examining the research questions of the study. The correlation matrix was used to identify 
the relationship between the variables and to also test the existence of a multi-collinearity 
problem by identifying the correlation coefficient between the variables using the variance 
inflation factors (VIF). A diagnostic test was also conducted so as to determine the 
appropriate regressions model that would produce a fair result. This test was considered 
necessary, especially in a situation where estimates differ widely between the different 
models. 














































































































Dummy variable identified as 
BIG 4 which is equal to one if 
the annual report of firm i's is 
attested by the Big 4 auditors 
(Ernst & Young, Deloitte, 
KPMG, and Price water house 
Coopers), and zero otherwise. 
 










Percentage change in total 
assets (At – At-1 / At-1)% 
 
Annual rate of GDP growth (in 
%)  
 
The average rate of interest 
charged on loans by 
commercial banks to private 
individual and companies (in 
%) 
Annual change in consumer 
price index (in %) 
Kane & Velury (2002); 
Adeyemi & Fagbemi 






Agyei & Owusu (2014); 
Somathilake & Udaya 
Kumara (2015); Shafana, 
(2016). 
 
Pfaffermayr, Stockl, & 
Winner (2008); Ezeoha & 




Muhammad et al., (2013) 
 
Ahmad et al., (2015) 
 
 
Booth et al., (2001), 
Gajurel (2005), Muthama 
et al., (2013) Buvanendra 
et al., (2016). 
 
Gajurel (2005); Muthama 






This chapter described the scope of the study and the data collection sources from the 
secondary data. In order to answer the research questions and achieve the objectives of this 
study, this chapter has discussed the framework of the study, hypotheses development, 




























DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
 
4.0 Introduction of the Empirical Results  
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics, correlation matrix, and regression analysis, 
and an interpretation of the results of the data collected for the study. The chapter begins 
with the descriptive statistics discussion for the data collected for debt ratio (dependent 
variable) and the independent variables under subsection 4.1. Then, the correlation matrix 
for the variables, which is normally used to examine the correlation that exist amongst the 
variable, is also reported, in subsection 4.2. For a meaningful conclusion to be drawn on 
the assumptions used in the analysis, various diagnostics tests were conducted and are 
discussed in subsection 4.3. The regression results for the panel data of the debt ratio are 
discussed in subsection 4.4. These analyses were used to test the earlier formulated 
hypotheses to establish the relationship which exists amongst the expressed variables, these 
was discussed in subsection 4.5. Furthermore, the additional analyses are also reported, in 
subsection 4.6 and a robust analysis of the other two proxies of the debt ratio (long-term 
and short-term debts) are discussed in subsection 4.7. The linkage between the findings 
and the study objectives are discussed in subsection 4.8. The chapter ends with the 
summary of the major findings of the study. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics were used to describe the trend of the variables used in the study. 
The table disclosed the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, 





was solved by winsorising all the continuous variables at the 5% top and bottom before the 
computation; as suggested by Dixon (1980), the winsorisation of data gives more stable 
results than trimmed means. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), Pallant (2011), 
and Griffin and Steinbrecher (2013), outliers can be described as those variables with 
skewness values above the range of ± 3.3 and kurtosis above the ± 10 range. The results 
presented in Table 4.1 below, in respect to skewness and kurtosis, indicate that all of the 
variables were within the acceptable ranges.  
Table 4.1  
Descriptive analysis for the variables (2012-2016) 
  Variable Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependent 
variable TDR 0.560 0.554 0.182 0.986 0.222 0.164 2.227 
Independent 
variables BS 8.685 9.000 5.000 13.000 2.202 0.307 2.300 
 BM 4.745 4.000 4.000 7.000 1.029 1.096 2.831 
 BI 0.775 0.800 0.550 0.909 0.105 -0.621 2.361 
 BHO 59.931 64.000 17.000 88.000 20.107 -0.655 2.576 
 MO 18.733 4.710 0.000 76.780 25.112 1.245 3.206 
 IO 49.574 55.000 0.000 87.950 27.290 -0.510 2.104 
 B4 0.543 1 0 1 0.499 -0.174 1.030 
 FA 31.042 32.000 5.000 59.000 16.699 0.071 1.907 
 FSL (In Log) 9.9430 9.9175 8.6234 11.319 0.7299 0.0479 2.254 
 FSN (In Million N) 3020 8270 420 208000 50800 2.476 8.531 
  FG 7.916 4.577 -20.925 54.280 17.844 0.902 3.704 
Control GDP 3.423 4.200 -1.600 6.200 2.764 -0.906 2.445 
Variables INF 10.700 9.000 8.100 15.700 2.892 0.790 2.031 
  BLR 12.400 12.000 11.000 14.000 1.021 0.272 1.956 
Note: TDR=Total debt ratio (Total debt / Total Debt +Total equity), BS= Board size (The number of 
directors on the firm board), BM= Board meeting (The number of board meetings held in a year), BI=Board 
independence (The proportion of independent and non-executive directors to the total number of board of 
directors), BHO=Block holders’ ownership (The percentage of the shareholding by block shareholders with 
5% minimum of equity ownership), MO=Managerial ownership (The percentage of ordinary shares held by 
all directors), IO=Institutional ownership (The aggregate percentage of shares held by institutions), B4=Big 
four audit firm (Dummy variable), FA=Firm age (Number of years since incorporation), FSL =Firm size 
(Logarithm of total assets) FSN=Firm size (Total asset book value in million Naira),FG=Firm growth 
(Percentage change in total assets), GDP=Gross domestic product (Annual rate of GDP growth %), 
INF=Inflation (Annual change in consumer price index %), BLR=Bank lending rate (The average rate of 





Table 4.1 on the descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables reveals 
several issues. The table illustrates that, on average, the sample of the listed firms had a 
high total debt ratio of 56%, which was, however, lower than the mean value of 73.5% 
reported by Olokoyo (2012). Olokoyo (2012) studied the impact of capital structure on the 
performance of the quoted firms in Nigeria, and a sample size of 101 non-financial listed 
firms was used over a five-year period (2003-2007). Using total debt to total assets as a 
measurement of the total debt ratio, a high mean ratio of 73.5% was recorded. Comparing 
the 73.5% average debt ratio reported by Olokoyo (2012) for the period of 2003-2007 with 
the 56% recorded in this study for the period of 2012-2016, it can be concluded that, there 
was a significant reduction in the availability of debt financing with an increase in equity 
financing for the Nigerian firms in recent times. 
 
The results reveal that, the average board size of the board of directors of the Nigerian 
listed firms during the period of the study was 9 members with the largest of 13 members. 
However, the minimum board size of 5 members indicated that, on average, all of the 
sample firms had complied with the 2011 SEC code, which requires a minimum of five (5) 
members on the board of directors (2011 SEC code section 4 sub 1&2). Similarly, on board 
meetings, the 2011 SEC code mandates the firm’s board of directors to arrange and preside 
over meetings on at least a quarterly basis (2011 SEC code section 12 sub 1&). The above 
results reveals a mean value of about 5 with a maximum of 7 and minimum of 4 indicating 
compliance with the provision. The board independence is the proportion of non-executive 
and independent directors on the board. The provision of the 2011 SEC code is that, the 





chairman, and the majority of the board members should be non-executive directors, and 
at least one of them should be an independent director (2011 SEC code section 4 (3)). The 
table shows a mean value of 77.5%, and maximum of 88% non-executive directors, with a 
minimum of 55%, indicating that all of the sample firms had a majority of their directors 
being non-executive directors in compliance with the provision.  
  
The table also reveals that the block holders and institutional ownership held a significant 
proportion of the outstanding equity shares of the Nigerian listed firms in recent years. The 
results disclosed a mean value of 59.93% and 49.57% for block holders and institutional 
investors, respectively, and also a maximum value of 88% for block holders and 87.95% 
for institution ownership. However, it was observed from the firms’ annual reports that, 
block ownership was in the hands of only a few individuals and institutional investors. The 
mean value of the managerial ownership stood at 18.733% and it ranged from 0% to 
76.78%. 
 
The age, size, and growth of the firms were also described in the descriptive analysis in 
Table 4.1 above. The minimum age recorded was 5 years and the maximum was 59 years, 
the mean value was around 31 years and the standard deviation was around 17 years. This 
implies the presence of a moderate variation in the age across the listed non-financial firms 
in Nigeria. The average of the book value of the total assets represented that the firm size 
was 3.020 billion naira, and the minimum and maximum values were 420 million naira and 





7.92%, with a standard deviation of 17.84%, maximum growth of 54.28%, and minimum 
growth of -20.93% also being recorded. 
4.2 Correlation Matrix  
The correlation matrix explains the degree of correlation that exists amongst variables. 
Table 4.2 discloses the results of the correlation between the variables used in the study. 
Pallant (2005) and Pallant (2011) suggested that a high correlation exists between 
independent variables when the r value is ≥ 0.9, which is an indication of multi-collinearity. 
All of the independent variables were below the threshold value of 0.90 as suggested by 
Pallant (2011). However, according to Gujarati (2012) and Studenmund (2014), the best 
remedy for multi-collinearity is to do nothing, but simply present the results of the fitted 
model because very often collinearity is essentially a data deficiency problem and, in some 
cases, the researcher might not have any choice over the data available for the research. On 







Table 4.2  
Correlation matrix of dependent and independent variables 
 TDR BS BM BI BHO MO IO B4 FA FS FG GDP INF BLR 
TDR 1                           
BS -0.111*** 1             
BM -0.134*** 0.175*** 1            
BI -0.091** 0.078* -0.112** 1           
BHO 0.014 -0.061 0.053 0.037 1          
MO -0.210*** -0.124*** -0.101** -0.053 0.079 1         
IO 0.010 0.088** 0.138*** 0.199*** 0.646*** -0.389*** 1        
B4 0.066 0.118*** 0.230*** 0.028 0.193*** -0.209*** 0.302*** 1       
FA 0.246*** 0.022 0.148*** 0.030 -0.016 -0.439*** 0.164*** 0.143*** 1      
FS 0.100** 0.417*** 0.266*** -0.169*** 0.078* -0.264*** 0.298*** 0.367*** 0.077* 1     
FG 0.122*** -0.012 0.031 0.054 0.157*** -0.036 0.172*** 0.125*** -0.042 0.162*** 1    
GDP -0.058 -0.014 -0.092** -0.021 -0.044 -0.015 -0.005 -0.016 -0.081* -0.027 -0.001 1   
INF 0.058 0.003 0.057 0.025 0.048 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.062 0.015 0.071 -0.868 1  
BLR 0.041 -0.009 0.090*** 0.007 0.039 0.007 0.011 0.022 0.050 0.022 0.073* -0.470*** 0.618*** 1 
 
*** (1% sig level), ** (5% sig level), *(10%sig level). 
 
Note: TDR=Total debt ratio (Total debt / Total Debt +Total equity), BS= Board size (The number of directors on the firm board), BM= Board 
meeting (The number of board meetings held in a year), BI=Board independence (The proportion of independent and non-executive directors to the 
total number of board of directors), BHO=Block holders’ ownership (The percentage of the shareholding by block shareholders with 5% minimum 
of equity ownership), MO=Managerial ownership (The percentage of ordinary shares held by all directors), IO=Institutional ownership (The 
aggregate percentage of shares held by institutions), B4=Big four audit firm (Dummy variable), FA=Firm age (Number of years since 
incorporation), FS=Firm size (Logarithm of total assets) , FG=Firm growth (Percentage change in total assets), GDP=Gross domestic product 
(Annual rate of GDP growth %), INF=Inflation (Annual change in consumer price index %), BLR=Bank lending rate (The average rate of interest 





It is important to note that, correlation is expressed on a scale from ±0 to ±1. The closer a 
correlation is to 0, the weaker it is. The closer a correlation is to 1, the stronger it is. 
According to Viv, Liz, and Jonathan (2003), a correlation value of zero (0) means that there 
is no linear correlation between the variables, whilst a correlation of one (1) means that the 
two variables have a perfect linear correlation. 
 
However, correlation is not expected to be greater than 1. Similarly, the positive (+ve) and 
negative (-ve) signs indicate the direction of movement of the two variables. A positive 
sign signifies movement towards the same direction whilst a negative sign indicates 
movement in an opposite direction. Meanwhile, the sign of the correlation does not indicate 
the strength of the relationship.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the correlation analysis has been presented based on the proxy 
of the debt ratio, which was the total debt ratio (TDR), and it was correlated jointly with 
the independent and control variables in the correlation matrix presented in Table 4.2. The 
board structure variables, managerial ownership, and Big 4 audit firms were not highly 
correlated amongst each other or amongst the control variables. However, some high 
correlation existed between block holder ownership and institutional ownership and also 
amongst the control variables (INF and GDP, BLR and INF). 
The correlation between block holder ownership and institutional ownership was 64.59% 
(positive), which depicted that 64.59% of the block holder ownership was constituted by 
institutional investors in the sample firms during the period of this study. The correlation 





correlation between the inflation and bank lending rates was 61.77%. To assess the 
possibility of having a problem of multi-collinearity as a result of the high correlation 
between the BHO and INF, and also amongst the control variables, the study used variance 
inflated factors to detect critical multi-collinearity (see Table 4.3). The general rule of 
thumb commonly used in empirical literature for determining the presence of critical multi-
collinearity is VIF≥10 or 1/VIF≤0.1 (see Gujarati, 2004; Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Talham, 2006). The results, as indicated in Table 4.3, disclose that the VIF values were 
below 10 and the tolerance values were higher than 0.1, so collinearity was not a problem 
for the analysis of this study.                                                                                                                                          
Table 4.3  












Note: TDR=Total debt ratio, BS= Board size, BM= Board meeting, BI=Board independence, BHO=Block 
holders’ ownership, MO=Managerial ownership, IO=Institutional ownership, B4=Big four audit firm, 
FA=Firm age, FS=Firm size, FG=Firm growth, GDP=Gross domestic product, INF=Inflation, BLR=Bank 
lending rate. 
 
From the correlation matrix presented in Table 4.2, all of the independent variables were 
below the threshold value of 0.90, which is an indication that critical multi-collinearity was 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
INF 5.35 0.186765 
GDP 4.25 0.235035 
IO 2.99 0.334323 
BHO 2.38 0.421027 
MO 1.74 0.574318 
FS 1.7 0.589093 
BLR 1.69 0.593001 
BS 1.31 0.765284 
B4 1.27 0.784861 
FA 1.24 0.803489 
BI 1.2 0.833596 
BM 1.19 0.83987 
FG 1.08 0.924639 





absent as suggested by Pallant (2011). However, those variables that were highly correlated 
(BHO & IO, GDP & INF) were regressed separately and reported in the additional analysis. 
Table 4.2 revealed that all of the board structures and managerial ownership structures, 
proxied via: Board size, Board meetings, Board independence, and Managerial ownership, 
were all negatively correlated with the Total debt ratio, whilst Block holders’ ownership, 
Institutional ownership, Big four audit firms, and firm characteristics, proxied via: Firm 
age, Firm size, and Firm growth, were positively correlated with the Total debt ratio. 
 
The correlation matrix quantifies the relationship between two variables, but ignores which 
one is dependent and which one is explanatory. The regression model goes beyond the 
correlation matrix by adding prediction capabilities and provides estimates of the values of 
the dependent variables from the values of the independent variables. Therefore, the 
researchers conducted a diagnostic test to determine the appropriate regression model for 
this study and based its relationship and prediction analysis on the results of the regression 
model used.  
 
4.3 Diagnostic Test 
In order to conduct further investigations and improve the validity of the statistical results, 
and also determine the best regression model appropriate for this study, the following 








Table 4.4  
Summary of Diagnostic Test result 
Testing for random effects 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
TDR [Firms,t] = Xb + u[Firms] + e[Firms,t] 
Estimated results: 
Var   sd = sqrt(Var) 
TDR  0.0491   0.2216 
e  0.012   0.1098 
 u  0.0309  
 0.1757  
Test: Var(u) = 0 
chibar2(01)  =  487.53 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 
 
Hausman testing for fixed effect 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2 (13) = (b-B)’[(V_b-V)^(-1)](b-B  = 22.40 
Prob > chi2 = 0.049 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
 
Heterokedasticity Test 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: BS BM BI BHO MO MO IO B4 FA FS FG GDP INF BLR 
chi2 (13)  = 70.73 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
 
Homoskedasticity Test 
White’s test for Ho: homoscedasticity 
against Ha: unrestricted heterokedasticity 
chi2 (99)  = 198.96 
Prob > chi2  =  0.0000 
 
Autocorrelation Test 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Ho: no first-order autocorrelation 
F( 1, 105) = 79.880 







Testing for random effects: The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects was conducted after running the ordinary least squares regression model. The null 
hypothesis is the random effects whilst the alternate hypothesis is the ordinary least squares 
(OLS). The results provide a chi-square value of 487.53 and a corresponding probability-
value of 0.0000. The result indicates that the null hypothesis could not be rejected since 
the probability value was less than 0.05. (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Hausman testing for fixed effects: This test was conducted after running the fixed effect 
model, so as to select between the random effect and the fixed effect. The test was 
conducted against the null hypothesis that preferred the random effect, but supported the 
fixed effect. The Hausman test results provided a chi-square value of 22.40 and a 
corresponding probability value of 0.049. The results indicate that the null hypothesis could 
not be rejected since the probability value was less than 0.05 (Baltagi, 2005).  
                         
Heteroscedasticity Test: This test was conducted to know if the disturbances appearing 
in the population regression were homoscedastic and a constant serial correlation through 
the random individual effects (see Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2005). The presence of 
heteroscedasticity signifies that it contradicts one of the assumptions of the classical linear 
regression, which states that the disturbances appearing in the population regression are 
homoscedastic, implying that the variance of the error term is constant. In the result 
obtained from the Breuch-Pagan/Cook-Weisber test for heteroscedasticity conducted in 
this study, the chi-square value was 70.73 and the probability value of 0.0000 was 





constant variance, indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. This signifies that the 
Ordinary Least Squares Model may not have been appropriate for this study. 
 
Homoscedasticity Test: In order to make further clarification, Cameron and Trivedi’s 
decomposition of the IM-test is also conducted to the test for homoscedasticity. The result 
obtained shows a chi-square value of 198.96 and probability value of 0.0000. Here, the 
researchers also failed to accept the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, but now accept 
the alternate hypothesis of the presence of unrestricted heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the 
Ordinary Least Squares Model may not have been appropriate, so the researchers needed 
a standard error estimate that was robust against the presence of the unrestricted 
heteroscedasticity as is recommended in Bailey and Katz (2011).     
                         
Autocorrelation Test: The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data was 
conducted. The null hypothesis was that, there was no first-order autocorrelation. The 
results show F (1,105) = 79.880 and prob.> F = 0.0000 (significant at 1%). The researchers 
failed to accept that there was no first-order autocorrelation.  
 
Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the simple OLS, and 
Random and Fixed Effect models may not have produced accurate estimates where such 
problems existed. However, Beck and Katz (1995) proposed a panel corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs) estimator as a way of obtaining better performance on the standard error 






- The variance of the residuals vary by unit of measurement, but remain constant over 
time. 
- Correlations between the residuals vary across pairs of units, but remain stable over 
time within each pair and are only existing or occurring in the same period of time 
(Beck & Katz 1995). 
-  
According to Hoechle (2007), Stata estimates these variances and correlations from the 
data and corrects them using the “xtpcse” command. Reed and Webb (2010) confirmed 
that the PCSEs provide a way of obtaining better performance on the standard error 
estimation at no cost of efficiency. The argument was also supported by Bailey and Katz 
(2011) where they argued that, the PCSEs’ standard error estimates are robust not only to 
unit heteroscedasticity, but they are also robust against possible contemporaneous 
correlation problems. Therefore, the panel corrected standard errors model was adopted for 
the study. Table 4.5 discloses the summary of the regression model results using the panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs); the details are in the appendix. 
 
4.4  Regression Results 
Regression analysis is one of the most important statistical techniques that helps to predict 
and estimate the strength and direction of the relationship (Studenmund, 2014). The 
summary of the results are presented in Table 4.5 using the PCSEs model, the details are 
in the appendix.                                                          
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*** (1% sig level), ** (5% sig level), *(10%sig level).                                                 
Note: TDR=Total debt ratio, BS= Board size, BM= Board meeting, BI=Board independence, 
BHO=Block holders’ ownership, MO=Managerial ownership, IO=Institutional ownership, 
B4=Big four audit firm, FA=Firm age, FS=Firm size FG=Firm growth, GDP=Gross 
domestic product (%), INF=Inflation (%), BLR=Bank lending rate (%). 
 
From the results in Table 4.5, it is interesting to note here that, the coefficients of all the 
board structure (Board size, Board meetings, and Board independence) and ownership 
structure variables (Managerial ownership and Institutional ownership) were negative and 
significantly related to the TDR. The coefficients of the block holder ownership (BHO) 
were positively and significantly related with the TDR, whilst the Big 4 firms showed a 
positive but insignificant relationship with the TDR. 
 
From the regression analysis results presented in Table 4.5, the coefficients of the firm-
specific characteristics: firm age (FA), firm size, and firm growth (FG), were statistically 
TDR Coef. Std. Err. z value P value Significant 
BS -0.014 0.003516 -3.98 0.000*** -ve sig 
BM -0.04391 0.007785 -5.64 0.000*** -ve sig 
BI -0.13471 0.076822 -1.75 0.080* -ve sig 
BHO 0.001526 0.000399 3.83 0.000*** +ve sig 
MO -0.00178 0.00021 -8.48 0.000*** -ve sig 
IO -0.00174 0.0003 -5.79 0.000*** -ve sig 
B4 0.010244 0.010698 0.96 0.338 Not sig 
FA 0.00286 0.000225 12.69 0.000*** +ve sig 
FS  0.046959 0.007333 6.4 0.000*** +ve sig 
FG 0.001492 0.000356 4.19 0.000*** +ve sig 
GDP  -0.0059 0.001173 -5.03 0.000*** -ve sig 
INF  -0.00233 0.001186 -1.96 0.050** -ve sig 
BLR 0.003847 0.001017 3.78 0.000*** +ve sig 
_cons 0.447072 0.089214 5.01 0.000  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000     
R-squared = 0.1786   





significant and positively related to the TDR. Whilst the coefficients of the control 
variables, GDP and INF, were significant and negatively related to the TDR, but the BLR 
was significant and positively related to the total debt ratio (TDR).  
 
4.5 Hypotheses Testing  
Some hypotheses were developed in chapter three so as to anticipate, assume, predict, 
project or propose the possible outcome of the results about the relationships between the 
independent variables of this study and the capital structure (Debt ratio) dependent 
variables. Individual hypotheses were examined in relation to the findings of this study. 




















Table 4.6  
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis  Statement    Findings Conclusion 
1 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 board size and the debt ratio    Significant negative Supported 
2 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 board meeting and the debt ratio   Significant negative  Supported 
3 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 board independence and the debt ratio  Significant negative Supported 
4 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 block holder ownership and the debt ratio  Significant positive Not-Supported 
5 There is a significant negative relationship between  
 Managerial ownership and the debt ratio  Significant negative Supported 
6 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 Institutional ownership and the debt ratio  Significant negative Supported 
7 There is a significant negative relationship between 
 B4 audit firm and the debt ratio   Insignificant positive Not-Supported 
8 There is a significant positive relationship between 
 firm age and the debt ratio   Significant positive Supported 
9 There is a significant positive relationship between 
 firm size and the debt ratio   Significant positive Supported 
10 There is a significant positive relationship between 
 firm growth and the debt ratio   Significant positive Supported  
 
The results from Table 4.6 disclosed that there was a significant negative relationship 
between board size and total debt ratio (TDR). The significant relationship was consistent 
with the agency theory assumption which postulates that, the principal and agent 
relationship influences the firm’s choice of financing. The negative results obtained, 
indicate that the sample firms preferred the monitoring control mechanisms to the debt 
control mechanisms as a useful governance device in reducing agent and principal conflicts 





pursue a lower debt. The results are consistent with the pecking order theory that, firms 
would prefer to use internal sources of financing. The results also support the scholars’ 
arguments that a large board size practice puts pressure on managers so that they adopt 
lower debt levels, which is consistent with Berger, et al. (1997); Abor (2005); Abor (2007); 
Hassan and Butt (2009); Heng and Azrbaijani (2012); and Uwuigbe (2013), who found that 
firms with larger boards tended to employ less debt. Therefore, hypothesis number one 
(H1) that predicted a negative relationship between board size and debt ratio was supported. 
 
The findings from the study indicate that there was a significant negative relationship 
between board meetings and total debt ratio (TDR). Very few studies focus on the impact 
of board meetings on the firm’s capital structure, however, the board meeting is an element 
of shareholders’ activities in controlling and monitoring the firm’s operation. The results 
indicate that, the level of the debt ratio decreased when the board held board meetings 
frequently. It can be predicted that frequent board meetings could exert strong pressure on 
managers not to take excessive debts. It is consistent with the agency theory that, managers 
should be monitored so as to ensure that they act for the best interests of the firm and the 
shareholders. The results provide support that board meetings could have a negative 
influence on the firm’s capital structure decisions.  Saad (2010), Kajananthan (2012), and 
Shafana (2016) supported this argument. Therefore, hypothesis number two (H2) that 
predicted a negative relationship between the board meetings and the debt ratio was 
supported. 
 
H3 predicted that there was a significant relationship between the board independence and 





a negative significant relationship with the TDR at a 10% level of significance. This 
indicated a weak significant negative relationship. Meaning that, the percentage of the 
independent and non-executive directors of the sample firms had a weak influence on the 
managers to adopt lower debt. The board independence had to do with the principal-agent 
relationship of the agency theory assumption that, the presence of more outside directors 
on the board provides active monitoring and influences managers to adopt more debt ratios 
(Berger, et al., 1997). Nevertheless, the negative relationship obtained from the results was 
consistent with the pecking order theory that, firms always prefer internal sources of 
finance. Therefore, hypothesis number three (H3) that predicted a negative relationship 
between the board independence and the debt ratio was supported. 
 
Table 4.6 disclosed that, block holder ownership (BHO) had a significant positive 
relationship with the total debt ratio (TDR). This is contrary to the negative hypothesis that 
block holders have an incentive to monitor the managers by preferring the monitoring 
mechanisms rather than the debt mechanisms, thereby reducing the debt financing to 
protect their investments. The positive significant relationship, recorded, indicated that the 
block holder ownership in the sample firms used the debt financing mechanisms to check 
the activities of the managers having one of the mechanisms postulated in the agency 
theory assumption. This is consistent with the agency theory assumption that, the increase 
in block holder ownership may influence the agent (managers) to opt for more debt 
(Nadeem & Sheikh, 2012). The results are consistent with the findings of Berger, et al. 
(1997)[ Brailsford, et al. (2002); Fosberg (2004), and Nadeem and Sheikh (2012), who also 
found a significant positive relationship. It confirms that firms with higher block holder 






Hypothesis number four (H4) was not supported as a positive relationship was found 
between the block holder ownership and the debt ratio. That is one of the peculiarities of 
developing countries where block holder ownership lies in only a few hands and there are 
weak corporate governance mechanisms and legal systems (Kararti, 2014). Therefore, 
block holder ownership plays the role of influencing the managers to opt for debt financing 
to safeguard the interests of the shareholders. Another reason might be the fact that the 
shareholders generally prefer debt financing because shareholders do not appreciate a 
dilution of the ownership interests. The positive relationship between the block holder 
ownership and the debt ratio is consistent with the debt control mechanisms postulated by 
the agency theory. 
   
As shown in Table 4.6, the study found a significant negative relation between the 
managerial ownership and the total debt ratio (TDR). This was consistent with the agency 
theory, which postulates that an increase in managerial ownership aligns the interests of 
the managers and the equity holders, thereby decreasing the role of debt as a tool to mitigate 
the agency conflicts. Bathala, et al. (1994); Zou and Xiao (2006); and Nadeem and Sheikh 
(2012) also found a significant negative relationship between the managerial ownership 
and the capital structure. They argued that firms with a high level of debt ratio face 
bankruptcy risks, therefore, equity financing will be more attractive for the managers to 
maintain their interests and positions. Managers usually act as risk averse; they normally 
avoid debt. Therefore, hypothesis number five (H5) that predicted a negative relationship 






The findings from the study indicated that there was a significant negative relationship 
between the Institutional ownership (IO) and the total debt ratio (TDR). This suggests that 
firms with high institutional shareholdings, on average, have relatively less total debt ratio. 
This indicates that an increase in the institutional ownership leads to a decrease in the total 
debt ratio, which is consistent with the findings of Hussainey and Aljifri (2012). The 
agency theory postulates that an optimal debt ratio and ownership structure can minimise 
agency costs (Al-Najjar & Taylor 2008). However, the negative relationship is in consistent 
with the agency theory assumption and suggests that the firms prefer monitoring control 
mechanisms to debt control mechanisms. Thus, the results are strongly supportive of 
hypothesis number six (H6) that predicted a negative relationship between the institutional 
ownership and the debt ratio. 
 
The results from Table 4.6 indicate that, the choice of external Big four auditors was 
statistically insignificant with the firm capital structure. This is contrary to the findings of 
Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008), Hussainey and Al-Nodel, (2009), and Hassan (2017) who 
found a positive significant relationship with the total debt ratio. However, it is consistent 
with Aljifri’s (2008) and Hussainey and Aljifri’s (2012) studies where they found that there 
was no significant relationship between engaging Big 4 audit firms or small audit firms 
with the financial choice. Thus, the external audit choice had no impact on the information 
asymmetry in Nigeria. And the reason might be that, on average, the firms’ board members 
are more conservative in relation to financial risk as argued by Hussainey and Aljifri 
(2012). Thus, the choice of external auditor did not have any significant influence on the 
debt ratio of the sample firms. Therefore, this study did not support the hypothesis that 





Table 4.6 disclosed that, firm age (FA) had a significant positive relationship with the total 
debt ratio (TDR). This finding suggested that firms use more debt over time in order to 
continue operation in the market and increase its capacity. This is consistent with the trade-
off and agency theories that postulate a positive relationship between firm age and debt 
ratio. The assumption is that firms that have been in business overtime have better access 
to debt financing. This argument was supported by Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2010); 
Ezeoha and Botha (2012); Zare, Farzanfar, and Boroumand (2013); and Chechet and 
Olayiwola (2014). Therefore, hypothesis number eight (H8) that predicted a positive 
relationship between firm age and debt ratio was supported. 
  
Table 4.6 disclosed that, firm size (FS) had a significant positive relationship with the total 
debt ratio (TDR). This finding suggests that larger firms tend to use more debt whilst 
smaller ones are more likely to use more equity. This argument was supported by Kurshev 
and Strebulaev (2015); Hovakimian, et al. (2004); Al-Sakran (2001); and Friend and Lang 
(1988). They argued that larger firms have better access to debt and they are able to employ 
more debt financing than smaller firms.  Therefore, hypothesis number nine (H9) that 
predicted a positive relationship between the firm size and the debt ratio was supported.  
H10 predicted that there is a significant relationship between the firm growth (FG) and the 
debt ratio. As shown in Table 4.6, the results indicate a positive significant relationship 
between the firm growth and the total debt ratio. This is consistence with the pecking order 
theory that postulates a positive relationship between the firm’s growth and its debt ratio; 
that, firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to become more leveraged 
overtime (Frank and Goyal, 2005). Other studies, such as Amanuel (2011); Solomon 





a positive significant relationship. Hypothesis number ten (H10) that predicted a positive 
relationship between the firm growth and the debt ratio was supported.  
 
4.6 Additional Analysis 
 
Table 4.7  
Additional analysis: highly correlated variables (IO/BHO and GDP/INF) 
      Without IO     Without  BHO       Without GDP           Without INF    
TDR P value Sig.       P value    Sig.     P value      Sig.         P value Sig.    P value            Sig.   
BS 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 
BM 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 
BI 0.080* -ve sig 0.005*** -ve sig 0.022* -ve sig 0.084* -ve sig 0.080* -ve sig 
BHO 0.000*** +ve sig (-) 0.986 Not sig ------- ------ 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 
MO 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 
IO 0.000*** -ve sig ------ ------ 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 
B4 (+) 0.338 Not sig (+) 449 Not sig (+) 0.202 Not sig (+) 0.330 Not sig (+) 0.332 Not sig 
FA 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 
FS 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 
FG 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 
GDP 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig 0.000*** -ve sig ----- ------ 0.000*** -ve sig 
INF 0.050* -ve sig 0.080* -ve sig 0.074* -ve sig 0.034* -ve sig ------- ------ 
BLR 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.000*** +ve sig 0.599 Not sig 0.105 Not sig 
_cons 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R- Squared 0.1786  0.1632       0.1704            0.1774  0.1784  
Wald chi2 (13) 2407.12  1491.36       1716.88            1769.24  2203.38 
Prob > chi2 0.000  0.000       0.000             0.000  0.000 
*** (1% sig level), ** (5% sig level), *(10%sig level). 
Note: TDR=Total debt ratio, BS= Board size, BM= Board meeting, BI=Board independence, 
BHO=Block holders’ ownership, MO=Managerial ownership, IO=Institutional ownership, 
B4=Big four audit firm, FA=Firm age, FS=Firm size FG=Firm growth, GDP=Gross domestic 
product (%), INF=Inflation (%), BLR=Bank lending rate (%). 
 
 
Table 4.7 disclosed the effects of the highly correlated variables indicated in Table 4.2. The 
result disclosed in Table 4.7 showed that dropping the institutional ownership (IO) variable 
from the model changed the results for the board independence (BI) from a 10% negative 
significant relationship to a 1% negative significant relationship with the debt ratio. 





significant relationship to an insignificant negative relationship with the debt ratio. This 
indicates the important role of institutional investors in influencing the financial choice of 
the firm. Due to the diversified portfolio of institutional investors, they have a strong 
interest in monitoring the activities of the management and the firm’s operation (Kararti, 
2014). Looking at the result disclosed in Table 4.7, the block holder ownership might not 
have significant influence on the firm’s financial choice if there are only a few institutional 
investors in the firm’s ownership structure holding 5% or more of the firm’s outstanding 
equity.    
 
Table 4.7 also disclosed that dropping the block holder ownership (BHO) variable from 
the model did not make any significant changes in the results when the block holder 
ownership was included. The effect on the regression result in each case was very little and 
negligible and depicted that the results were valid. This was consistent with Gujarati (2012) 
and Studenmund (2014) who reported that the best remedy for multi-collinearity is to do 
nothing but simply present the results of the fitted model. 
 
4.7 Robust Analysis 
Many scholars have examined the association between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and the capital structure (Berger, et al., 1997; Wen, et al., 2002; Abor & 
Biekpe, 2007; Rehman, et al. 2010; Saad, 2010; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012; Nadeem, & 
Sheikh, 2012; and Conyon & He, 2014). However, there was no agreement amongst the 
researchers on the direction of the relationships between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and the capital structure. Consistent with Bevan and Danblt’s (2002) 





may appear to vary significantly, depending upon the components of the capital structure 
that have been analysed. Thus, the analysis of the capital structure is incomplete without 
the detailed investigation into the various forms of the firm’s debt (Bevan and Danblt, 
2002).  
 
Total debt is the combination of items listed as the non-current and current liabilities’ 
sections of the firm’s financial statement. The non-current liabilities refer to the debts with 
more than a twelve (12) month maturity period and are called long-term debts. Current 
liabilities, on the other hand, refer to debts due for repayment within twelve (12) months, 
they are short-term debts. The procedure of accessing each of these forms of debt are 
significantly different, thus their relationships with the corporate governance mechanisms 
may appear to vary significantly. The robust analysis of other forms of the firm’s debt 
financing and their relationships with corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics have beene discussed in this section so as to provide additional information 
about the variables used in this study. 
 
Table 4.8 reveals that, out of the mean value of the total debt, 56.03%, the short-term debt 
was 38.79% whilst the long-term debt was 16.35%, indicating less availability of secure 
and sustainable long-term loan facilities in the business environment. On the other hand, 
looking at the total debt and total equity ratio, the results indicate that the proportion of the 
capital structure of the sample firms were 43.97% equity and 56.03% debt (38.79% short-









Table 4.8  
Descriptive analysis of debt structure 
Variable Mean Median Min Max 
Std. 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
TDR 0.5603 0.554019 0.181779 0.986221 0.221564 0.164384 2.226676 
TER 0.4397 0.445982 0.013779 0.818221 0.221564 -0.16438 2.226676 
LTDR 0.1635 0.123182 0 0.475937 0.144966 0.82973 2.594024 
STDR 0.3879 0.360072 0.081465 0.819785 0.206087 0.509446 2.428361 
Note: TDR=Total debt ratio (Total debt / Total Debt +Total equity), TER=Total equity 
ratio (Total equity / Total Debt +Total equity), LTDR=Long-term debt ratio (Total long-
term debt / Total Debt +Total equity), STDR=Short-term debt ratio (Total short-term debt 
/ Total Debt +Total equity), 
  
These results have revealed that the Nigerian listed firms, during this period of the study, 
found it difficult to secure long-term loans, therefore, they were dependent on retained 
earnings and if debt was required, the short-term debt was preferred to the long-term debt. 
This type of situation indicates that the firms are not fully making use of long-term debts 
in their capital structures as suggested by the agency theory. A possible reason for this type 
of situation may be as a result of the various costs associated with debt as postulated by the 
trade-off theory (De Wet, 2006).  
 
The findings also confirm the argument of Echekoba, and Ananwude (2016) that, Nigerian 
listed firms in recent times have mostly depended on retained earnings and short-term 
debts.  Another interpretation of the mean value of the capital structure ratio, in this 
situation from Table 4.8, which was a ratio of 44:39:17 for equity, short-term debt, and 
long-term debt, respectively, this confirmed the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria in recent times. The situation can be associated with the pecking order and trade-
off theory which state that there is no well- defined debt ratio; firms prioritise and adapt 





To give a clear understanding of the findings in this work, from the descriptive statistics, 
there is a need to take a quick look at the descriptive findings of Salawu (2007b) and 
Olokoyo (2012) related to the capital structure as presented in Table 4.10. It reveals the 
trend of the capital structure in the Nigerian listed firms. 
 
Table 4.9  
Trend of capital structure in Nigeria listed firms   
Period  Equity Total debt Long term  Short term  Author 
debt  debt   
1990-2004 31.17 68.83  8.17  60.66  Salawu (2007b) 
2003-2007 26.5 73.5  27.6  45.9  Olokoyo (2012) 
2012-2016 43.97 56.03  16.35  38.79  This study 
 
 
Salawu (2007b) examined an empirical analysis of the capital structure of the selected 
quoted firms in Nigeria between 1990 and 2004. The analysis was performed on a sample 
of 50 non-financial firms in Nigeria. Olokoyo (2012) studied the impact of the capital 
structure on the performance of the quoted firms in Nigeria, and a sample size of 101 non-
financial listed firms was used over a five-year period (2003-2007). Based on the results in 
Table 4.9, one can see a steady reduction in the short-term debt ratio despite it being 
extremely higher than the long-term debt ratio. This analysis showed that the short-term 
debt still made up a high percentage of debt financing, meaning that there was still 
difficulty in accessing long-term debt financing, which is an indication that the Nigerian 
long-term debt market is relatively under-developed. Thus, most firms have no choice but 
to rely mainly on short-term debt financing. Another reason for the low level of long-term 
debt financing is that accessing long-term loans in Nigerian banks is very cumbersome, 
and are rarely given in most cases because of the poor business environment in Nigeria, 





For the robust analysis, the debt ratio was viewed from the long-term and short-term debt 
ratios’ perspectives as suggested by Bevan and Danbolt (2002) who said that, analysing 
the capital structure solely upon one ratio provides only one part of the story. They argued 
further that, a detailed understanding of capital structure requires the analysis of all of the 
forms of the firm’s debt. The two equations were regressed separately using the panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression model. A comparison was made between the 
results obtained from the two models and the results from the main proxy used for the debt 
ratio. 
Table 4.10 
 Summary of Regression result for LTDR using PCSEs 
 
 











            *** (1% sig level), ** (5% sig level), *(10%sig level).                                                 
Note: LTDR=Long term debt ratio, BS= Board size, BM= Board meeting, 
BI=Board independence, BHO=Block holders’ ownership, MO=Managerial 
ownership, IO=Institutional ownership, B4=Big four audit firm, FA=Firm 
age, FS=Firm size FG=Firm growth, GDP=Gross domestic product (%), 
INF=Inflation (%), BLR=Bank lending rate (%). 
 
 
LTDR Coef. Std. Err. z value P value Significant 
BS 0.004693 0.003367 1.39 0.163 Not sig 
BM -0.03431 0.006325 -5.43 0.000*** -ve sig 
BI -0.02458 0.036492 -0.67 0.501 Not sig 
BHO 9.42E-05 0.000199 0.47 0.637 Not sig 
MO 8.37E-05 0.000115 0.73 0.468 Not sig 
IO -0.00023 0.000121 -1.94 0.052* -ve sig 
B4 -0.03903 0.011219 -3.48 0.001*** -ve sig 
FA 6.53E-05 0.000322 0.2 0.839 Not sig 
FS 0.034858 0.005208 6.69 0.000*** +ve sig 
FG -1E-05 0.000392 -0.03 0.979 Not sig 
GDP -0.00192 0.000955 -2.01 0.045** -ve sig 
INF -0.00296 0.000943 -3.14 0.002*** -ve sig 
BLR 0.005235 0.001113 4.7 0.000*** +ve sig 
_cons -0.04499 0.062553 -0.72 0.472  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000     
R-squared = 0.0924   





Table 4.11  
Summary of Regression result for STDR using PCSEs 
 STDR Coef. Std. Err. z value P value Significant 
BS -0.0155 0.003351 -4.62 0.000*** -ve sig 
BM -0.00508 0.006219 -0.82 0.414 Not sig 
BI -0.15037 0.059264 -2.54 0.011*** -ve sig 
BHO 0.0014 0.000402 3.48 0.001*** +ve sig 
MO -0.00169 0.00016 -10.53 0.000*** -ve sig 
IO -0.00151 0.000301 -5.02 0.000*** -ve sig 
B4 0.04021 0.011744 3.42 0.001*** +ve sig 
FA 0.002916 0.0003 9.71 0.000*** +ve sig 
FS 0.006688 0.007399 0.9 0.366 Not sig 
FG 0.001758 0.000424 4.15 0.000*** +ve sig 
GDP -0.00272 0.00136 -2 0.046** -ve sig 
INF -0.00026 0.001352 -0.19 0.850 Not sig 
BLR 0.001438 0.001686 0.85 0.394 Not sig 
_cons 0.487239 0.103361 4.71 0.000  
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000     
R-squared = 0.1852   
Wald chil2 (13) = 898.7800     
            *** (1% sig level), ** (5% sig level), *(10%sig level).                                                 
Note: STDR=Total debt ratio, BS= Board size, BM= Board meeting, 
BI=Board independence, BHO=Block holders’ ownership, MO=Managerial 
ownership, IO=Institutional ownership, B4=Big four audit firm, FA=Firm 
age, FS=Firm size FG=Firm growth, GDP=Gross domestic product (%), 
INF=Inflation (%), BLR=Bank lending rate (%). 
 
Table 4.12  
Summary Robust Analysis regression results 
  TDR LTDR STDR 
BS  -ve sig Not sig -ve sig 
BM  -ve sig -ve sig Not sig 
BI  -ve sig Not sig -ve sig 
BHO  +ve sig Not sig +ve sig 
MO  -ve sig Not sig -ve sig 
IO  -ve sig -ve sig -ve sig 
B4  Not sig -ve sig +ve sig 
FA  +ve sig Not sig +ve sig 
FS  +ve sig +ve sig Not sig 
FG  +ve sig Not sig +ve sig 
GDP  -ve sig -ve sig -ve sig 
INF  -ve sig -ve sig Not sig 
BLR  +ve sig +ve sig Not sig 





The results of this robust analysis summarised in Table 4.12 indicates a significant 
difference between the results for the long term debt ratio and the total debt ratio. However, 
when considering the difference between the short-term debt ratio and the total debt ratio, 
the results are not as different as the long term and total debt ratio results. That is an 
indication of the predominance of short-term debts in the firms’ debt structures. Therefore, 
analyses based solely upon long-term debts may provide different and limited insights into 
the relationships between the corporate governance mechanisms and the capital structure. 
From Table 4.12, the results of the long-term debt ratio (LTDR) indicate significant 
differences from those of the total debt ratio (TDR) relationships. The relationships 
between the long-term debt ratio (LTDR) and the board size (BS), board independence 
(BI), block holder ownership (BHO), managerial ownership (MO), firm age (FA), and firm 
growth (FG) were insignificant, whereas, they all had significant relationships with the 
total debt ratio (TDR).  
 
Moreover, Big 4 audit firms (B4) showed a negative significant relationship with the 
LTDR, but an insignificant relationship was recorded with the TDR. The discrepancy 
recorded in the TDR and LTDR was an indication that with the presence of the Big 4 audit 
firms, the level of the information asymmetry between the firm and the investors was 
reduced, hence the investors had confidence in the firm’s financial statements and 
assurance in the future earnings in the stock market. Therefore, the managers of the firms 
with financial statements audited by any of the Big 4 audit firms might be influenced to 






From Table 4.12, the results on the short-term debt ratio (STDR) indicates slight 
differences from that of the total debt ratio (TDR) relationship. The relationship between 
the short-term debt ratio (STDR) and the board meetings (BM), firm size (FS), Inflation 
(INF), and bank lending rate (BLR) were insignificant; whereas, they all had significant 
relationships with the total debt ratio (TDR).  
 
Big 4 audit firms recorded a significant positive relationship with the short-term debt ratio 
(STDR). This is contrary to a significant negative relationship recorded with the long-term 
debt ratio (LTDR) and also the insignificant relationship that was recorded with the total 
debt ratio. This indicates that the choice of Big 4 audit firms as a firm’s external auditor 
might influence the financial choice of the firm. The positive significant relationship 
recorded between the short-term debt ratio and the Big 4 firms predicted that firms with 
Big 4 auditors might opt for short-term debt, considering it is cheaper and has easy access.  
The lenders are more likely to give debts to such firms, thereby making it easier for the 
firm managers to opt for the short-term debt. 
 
The negative significant relationship recorded between the long-term debt ratio and Big 4 
firms predicted that firms using B4 auditors might prefer the monitoring control 
mechanisms instead of the long-term debt control mechanisms so as to prevent the firm 
from facing bankruptcy risks. The presence of the Big 4 auditors might influence the firm 
managers to opt for lower long-term debt. 






4.8 Linking the findings with the Study Objectives. 
The objectives of this study were clearly enumerated in chapter one sub-section 1.4. 
Thereafter, the attempt at this level was to link up those objective stated with the findings, 
so as to assess if those objectives were actually accomplished or the opposite. The first 
objective of the study was to examine the significant relationships between the board 
structures (board size, board meetings, and board independence) and the capital structure. 
Looking at the main analysis as presented in section 4.4 of this chapter, the board structures 
(board size, board meetings, and board independence) were found to have significant 
influence on the capital structure of the sample firms. It was found that all other of the 
board structures proxied for the corporate governance mechanisms had strong negative 
significant relationships with the total debt ratio (TDR).  
 
The negative relationships depict that, the firms prefer monitoring control mechanisms 
instead of debt control mechanisms. An increase in board size leads to a reduction in the 
debt ratio, more frequent board meetings reduce the use of debt, and an increase in the 
proportion of the non-executive directors in the board can also lead to a reduction in the 
debt ratio. 
  
The second objective, stated in the earlier part of this study, was to examine the significant 
relationships between the ownership structures (block holder ownership, managerial 
ownership, and institutional ownership) and the capital structure. Looking at the main 
analysis as presented in section 4.4 of this chapter, the ownership structures (block holder 





reasonable influence on the capital structure of the sample firms. It was found that 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership as proxies for the ownership structure in 
the corporate governance mechanism had strong negative significant relationships with the 
total debt ratio (TDR). Whilst the block holder ownership indicated a positive significant 
relationship. 
  
The negative relationship depicts that, if there is an increase in the managerial ownership, 
there will be a reduction in the debt ratio. Similarly, an increase in the institutional 
ownership might also lead to a reduction in the debt ratio. On the other hand, the positive 
relationship recorded for the BHO depicts that as a firm increases in the equity share of the 
block holder ownership, there will be an increase in the debt ratio of the sample firms. The 
findings disclose that managers may be forced to take more debt when a significant and 
influential block holder is present. 
 
The third objective, stated in the earlier part of this study, was to examine the significant 
relationship between the firms’ specific characteristics and the capital structure of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. However, the findings from the panel regressions presented in section 4.4 
of this chapter indicate a positive significant relationship between all of the firms’ specific 
characteristics’ proxies used in the study: firm age (FA), firm size (FS), and firm growth 
(FG) with the total debt ratio (TDR). The positive relationship depicts that as a firm 
increases in age and also increases in the total assets value, there will be an increase in the 





opportunities that have exceeded the firm’s internal funds, thus the debt ratio has also 
increased. 
 
The fourth objective of the study was to examine the significant relationship between the 
board structure’s choice of external auditors (Big 4) and the capital structure. The 
insignificant relationship recorded between the Big 4 auditors and the debt ratio depicts 
that the choice of Big 4 audit firms does not have any significant influence on the choice 
of the capital structure of the firms. 
 
A closer look at the overall results of the findings disclose that the corporate governance 
mechanisms influenced the capital structure (Debt ratio) negatively whilst the firms’ 
specific characteristics influenced the capital structure positively. These results depict that, 
an increase in board size, frequent board meetings, and an increase in the proportion of the 
non-executive directors on the board had an inverse relationship with the debt ratio. 
Similarly, an increase in managerial ownership and in institutional ownership also had an 
inverse relationship with the debt ratio. An increase in the outstanding equity of block 
holders, on the other hand, had a positive influence on the debt ratio, which is consistent 
with the debt control mechanisms of the agency theory assumption. The overall assumption 
from these results was that, the board and ownership structure used the monitoring control 







The influence of firm characteristics, on the other hand, disclosed a positive influence on 
the firm debt ratio. An increase in firm assets can lead to an increase in the debt ratio, and 
an increase in firm investment opportunities showing firm growth can lead to an increase 
in debt ratio. An increase in firm age is an indication that the firm has been in continuous 
business over time and this give the firm access to easy debt financing. All these are 
amongst the factors that influence the firms to increase their debt ratios.  
 
4.9 Summary of the Findings 
The regression results in Table 4.5 answered all the research questions of this study, where 
it showed the relationship and the influence of all the features of the corporate governance 
mechanisms on the debt ratio. It also showed the influence of the firm characteristics 
variables used in the study on the debt ratio, and similarly, the influence of the external 
auditor choice on the debt ratio.  
  
Our major findings in this research indicate that corporate governance mechanisms had 
significant influence on the capital structure decisions of the firms. The board structure 
(board size, board meetings, and board independence) influenced the capital structure 
decisions with the use of monitoring control mechanisms to put pressure on the firm 
managers to opt for lower debts. This is consistence with the monitoring control 
mechanisms postulated by the agency theory. Similarly, the managerial and institutional 
ownerships also influenced the firms’ financial choices. A negative significant relationship 





managerial and institutional ownerships on the debt ratios followed the monitoring control 
mechanisms of the agency theory. 
 
The block holder ownership (BHO) also had significant influence on the firms’ financial 
choices, however, the significant positive relationship recorded between block holder 
ownership and debt ratio depicted that block holders use substitute debt financing control 
mechanisms to check the activities of the managers, thereby influencing the managers to 
opt for debt financing. The debt control mechanisms are also consistent with the agency 
theory assumption, as suggested by Myers (1977) that, the short-term debt could alleviate 
agency conflicts that exist between the agents and the principals, particularly the 
underinvestment problem in the firms. Also, an increase in the debt ratio leads to an 
increase in the firm’s financial risk, which could motivate the managers to reduce agency 
costs so as to maintain the financial ability of the firm to meet its debt and its burden, on 
time (Harvey, Lins, & Roper, 2004).  
 
 The third objective stated in the earlier part of this study was to examine the significant 
relationship between the firm characteristics and capital structure decisions in the Nigerian 
listed firms. The direction of the relationship and the level of significance may slightly 
defer for different proxies of capital structure and the business environment in which the 
firms are operating, which will continue to produce mixed empirical results, and leave the 







                         SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1    Summary 
Decisions on firms’ capital structures remain the most controversial decision amongst the 
firms’ strategic decision making process, and that is why it is a heated issue in corporate 
finance. This study, basically, examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, firm characteristics, and capital structure decisions using macroeconomic 
factors as control variables. The study employed descriptive statistics and econometric 
analytical tools in studying 106 Nigerian listed non-financial firms with 530 observations 
for the period of 2012-2016. The analyses were performed using secondary panel data. The 
study employed total debt ratio as a proxy for capital structure in the main analysis, and 
two other measurements of debt ratio, which were long-term debt ratio and short-term debt 
ratio, as proxies for capital structure in the robust analysis. The research came up with the 
following findings that are of salient importance to scholars, investors, and policy makers 
who have an interest in investigating issues relating to the capital structure ratio in Nigerian 
listed firms. 
 
The average total debt to total assets of the Nigerian firms during the period of this study 
was 56% whilst equity contributed the remaining 44% average. However, about 70% of 
the total debt was short-term debt (current liability) whilst the remaining 30% was long-
term debt. (Non-current liability).The relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms, featuring board and ownership structure, and capital structure were 





age, firm size, and firm growth) and capital structure were significant positive 
relationships. However, the strength of the relationships slightly differed with each of the 
proxies for capital structure (Total debt ratio, long-term debt ratio, and short-term debt 
ratio). Macroeconomic variables also had some significant relationships with capital 
structure and this may account for the short-term debt financing nature of the Nigerian 
Firms. 
 
5.2 Recapitulation of the Study’s key Findings 
The key findings of this study were highlighted from two perspectives. Firstly, the result 
from the descriptive statistics with respect to all the proxies used to measure the debt ratio, 
corporate governance mechanisms, and firm characteristics. Secondly, the result from the 
panel regression with respect to the corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics relationship with debt ratio, and the robust analysis of the relationship with 
other forms of the firm’s debt financing, which has not been extensively explored in the 
Nigerian context. The study showed very fascinating results in terms of the capital structure 
of the non-financial listed firms in Nigeria. For the fact that the study was conducted after 
the implementation of the Corporate Governance Code 2011 issued by the security and 
exchange commission (SEC) in Nigeria. The inverse relationship recorded between the 
corporate governance mechanisms (board and ownership structure) and the total debt ratio 
was an indication that, effective implementation of the Corporate Governance Code 2011 
is a good strategy targeted at using more equity to keep the Nigerian firms relevant in the 





However, firms with more block holder ownership may not prefer equity financing as the 
result indicated a significant positive relationship between block holder ownership and debt 
ratio (total debt and short-term debt). Furthermore, the relationship between Big 4 audit 
firm and total debt ratio was insignificant from the result of the main analysis presented. 
However, the result in the robust analysis disclosed a negative relationship between Big 4 
audit firm and long term debt (LTDR), while positive relationship was recoded with short 
term debt (STDR). This is an indication that the relationship between Big 4 audit firm and 
debt ratio depend on debt financing policy adopted by the firm. The study provided 
evidences that besides firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms has 
significant influence on the firm capital structure.   
 
5.3 Contribution of the Study 
The capital structure decision is an important concept for the academicians and the 
practitioners and that is why it is a heated issue in corporate finance. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge few studies have combined the corporate governance mechanisms 
as well as firm-specific characteristics to measure their influence on the capital structure in 
the Nigerian listed non-financial firms as a whole. This study extended our knowledge of 
corporate governance mechanisms and their influence on the capital structure of the non-
financial listed firms in Nigeria. Adequate and comprehensive data for five years (2012–
2016) for all non-financial listed firms were used for the analysis in this study. This study 
is expected to be an important empirical contribution in the area of corporate governance.  
The first objective of the study was to examine the relationship between board structure 





firms in Nigeria. The main finding revealed that board structure had a significant negative 
relationship with the capital structure decisions of the sample firms. The second objective 
was to examine the relationship between the ownership structure (block holder ownership, 
managerial ownership, and institution ownership) and the capital structure of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. The main finding revealed that managerial ownership and institutional 
ownership had significant negative relationships with the capital structure decisions of the 
sample firms whilst the relationship with block holder ownership was significant and 
positive. 
 
  The third objective of the study was to examine the relationship between the firm 
characteristics (firm size, firm age, and firm growth) and the capital structure of the listed 
firms in Nigeria. The main finding revealed that the firm characteristics had a significant 
positive relationship with the capital structure decisions of the sample firms. Whilst the 
fourth objective was to examine the relationship between the external auditor (Big 4 audit 
firms) and the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria. The main finding revealed 
that the external auditor choice had no significant relationship with the capital structure 
decisions of the sample firms. 
 
The study contributes to literature by looking at the strategic decisions regarding capital 
structure decisions by arguing the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on 
capital structure decisions. The practical contribution is that the corporate governance 





therefore, they must be considers a lot when making corporate governance policies for the 
firms. 
 
The study contributes to the literature by arguing the influence of board meetings and board 
independence on firm debt ratio. Most empirical studies conducted on the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms on debt ratio were conducted in developed countries,  
but a paucity of studies used board meetings and board independence as corporate 
governance proxies as evidence from developing countries. The study has argued that the 
board meetings and board independence influence the debt ratio, contributes to the agency 
theory’s monitoring control mechanisms assumption. That is, that an increase in frequency 
of board meetings and increase in the proportion of outside directors might put pressure on 
the firm’s management to opt for lower debt.  
 
The study also contributes to literature by explaining the influence of ownership structure 
on capital structure. The study has argued that managerial and institutional ownership 
influence capital structure negatively whilst block holder ownership influences capital 
structure positively, therefore, it must be considered whilst issuing equity shares for the 
firm. The study has also argued that, for better access to financing, less cost of capital, 
better consideration for all the firm’s stakeholders, and better firm performance, the 
corporate governance policy of the firm must be considered. The study also explained the 
influence of firm characteristics on the firm debt ratio, as it was learned from previous 






Furthermore, the methodological contribution of this study could be viewed from the 
perspective of using the panel data methodology and, particularly, employing the panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression model on data with the presence of 
unrestricted heteroskedasticity, and first-order autocorrelation after performing the robust 
test.  
 
This study could also be considered as an addition to knowledge and to the series of studies 
and existing literature conducted in the Nigerian context and, globally, in the area of 
corporate governance and corporate finance. It is expected to add substance to the dearth 
of literature as the study elucidated the influence of the corporate governance mechanisms 
as well as firm characteristics on the financial structure of the Nigeria firms. 
 
5.4    Conclusion 
The result of this empirical research has revealed that some features of the corporate 
governance mechanism and firm-specific characteristics are very relevant for explaining 
the capital structure of firms in Nigeria similar to firms in developed countries. This 
suggests that some of the insights from modern capital structure theories are portable to the 
Nigerian business environment. Overall, the empirical results from this study offer some 
support for monitoring the mechanism assumption of the agency theory as board structure, 
managerial ownership, and institution ownership disclosed inverse relationships with debt 
ratio. Whilst, on the other hand, block holder ownership offers support for the debt control 
mechanisms of the agency theory as block holder ownership disclosed a positive 





The pecking order theory postulates the need for debt finance first, before opting for equity 
financing whenever an internal source is not sufficient for firm operation. The significant 
positive relationships between firm size, firm growth, and firm age with debt ratio disclosed 
in the study go with the pecking order assumption that older and bigger firms, with 
investment growth opportunities, use more of debt financing than equity financing. 
Increases in firm assets might demand additional finance above the internal source, 
therefore, calling for debt financing as the next alternative. Firm growth is an indication of 
an increase in investment opportunities which might also call for additional finance, more 
than the retained earnings of the firm; the result would be the debt financing option. 
 
The trade-off theory explains that the selection of the firm’s capital structure is the outcome 
of the trade-off between the cost of debt and its benefit. The theory postulates that firms 
that have been in business for a longer period have better access to debt financing and the 
cost of the debt is less for older firms. The significant positive relationship between firm 
age and debt ratio disclosed in the study offers support for this trade-off assumption. A 
remarkable difference between the capital structures in Nigerian firms and firms in 
developed countries (example, the United States, Switzerland, etc.) was that Nigeria firms 
presumably prefer short-term debt financing with a substantially lower ratio of long-term 
debt. The implication is that Nigerian firms rely heavily on the short-term debt financing 
choice rather than the long-term debt finance and this, to an extent, might limit the 







5.5    Recommendations 
The results of this study are strongly supportive of the agency theory that postulates 
monitoring control mechanisms in the relationships amongst the corporate governance 
mechanisms and capital structure decisions. Board structure, managerial ownership, and 
institution ownership most strongly influence capital structure through their monitoring 
control mechanisms. In line with the findings of this study, the authors make the following 
recommendations: 
For the firm’s management to decide on the appropriate mix of debt and equity that will 
ensure the firm continues as  an  ongoing concern, the corporate governance policy issues 
of the firm should be of great concern to the firm’s management. 
 
Nigeria as a developing country aims to attract more foreign investors, better access of 
Nigerian firms to financing, less cost of capital, better consideration for all of the firms’ 
stakeholders and better firm performance to enhance the country’s economic growth and 
development. Sound and effective corporate governance practices must be put in place 
across all the firms in the Nigerian capital market.  Nigerian firms rely on a short-term debt 
financing choice which forms the major part of their debt ratio. The establishment of an 
independent director system and an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors 
in the board enhance monitoring control mechanisms thereby reducing the use of debt as 
control mechanisms. This, in turn, will reduce bankruptcy and the financial distress 
associated with short-term debt, and focus more on developing internal strategies that can 





The implementation of the corporate governance code 2011 issued by the security and 
exchange commission of Nigeria should be made mandatory across all the firms, not only 
the capital market participants and include punishment for firms that break the regulation.  
The findings show that firms in Nigeria do not use much of a long-term debt in their 
respective capital structure choices. This may be due to the generally poor participation of 
both public and private sectors in the bond market and other macroeconomic factors. The 
Nigerian Stock Exchange and Central Bank of Nigeria should, therefore, strive to remove 
any rigid policies which could hinder the effective participation of the firms in the capital 
market. Economic policies that could help further develop the capital market in such a way 
that it can absorb any increase in demand for funds should be formulated.  
 
The finding of this study is clearly of benefit to the regulators and the investors. For the 
regulators, the result can be used to evaluate the current corporate governance policy across 
the firms and make the appropriate amendments where necessary. As for the investors, they 
can use the result of the study in the composition of the board structure and issuing of 
equity shares so as to enhance the internal corporate governance quality that can safeguard 
their investments effectively. 
 
5.6 Limitations of the Study 
The study only covered data of 106 active non-financial listed firms in the Nigerian stock 
exchange market, which is the most considerable and preferable index for lenders and 
investors in the Nigerian capital market. The study excluded firms in the financial 





are quite different from the other sectors. Also the study did not represent any unlisted 
firms; the study only focused on firms listed on the Nigerian stock exchange market, and 
the findings may not be generalisable on all firms in Nigeria. Further studies could consider 
the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Nigeria. 
 
This research work only focused on the issues raised in the research questions. Firstly, the 
issue of whether a significant relationship exists between board structures (board size, 
board meetings, and board independence) and the capital structure of the listed firms in 
Nigeria. Secondly, was to find out if any significant relationship exists between ownership 
structures (block holder ownership, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership) 
and the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria. Thirdly, was whether a significant 
relationship exists between the firms’ specific characteristics (firm size, firm age, and firm 
growth) and the capital structure of the listed firms in Nigeria? Lastly, was whether a 
significant relationship exists between external auditor choice (Big 4 audit firm) and the 
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   TDRwinsor    .5603101  .5540185  .1817792  .9862211  .2215642  .1643836  2.226676
                                                                                    





Appendix B: VIF and Tolerance value for Independent variables 
 
 





                                    
    FGwinsor        1.09    0.914079
    BMwinsor        1.16    0.862951
    BIwinsor        1.21    0.826751
          B4        1.27    0.790180
    FAwinsor        1.29    0.777647
    BSwinsor        1.29    0.776083
         BLR        1.68    0.595597
    FSwinsor        1.69    0.592838
    MOwinsor        1.82    0.549073
   BHOwinsor        2.34    0.426763
    IOwinsor        2.99    0.334596
         GDP        4.28    0.233491
         INF        5.36    0.186557
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
         BLR     0.0215   0.0496   0.0223   0.0732  -0.4699   0.6177   1.0000 
         INF     0.0047   0.0620   0.0146   0.0708  -0.8675   1.0000 
         GDP    -0.0161  -0.0805  -0.0271  -0.0010   1.0000 
    FGwinsor     0.1245  -0.0424   0.1618   1.0000 
    FSwinsor     0.3672   0.0773   1.0000 
    FAwinsor     0.1428   1.0000 
          B4     1.0000 
                                                                             
                     B4 FAwinsor FSwinsor FGwinsor      GDP      INF      BLR
         BLR     0.0413  -0.0094   0.0899   0.0067   0.0393   0.0066   0.0106 
         INF     0.0580   0.0034   0.0572   0.0251   0.0479   0.0107   0.0062 
         GDP    -0.0576  -0.0139  -0.0915  -0.0210  -0.0438  -0.0147  -0.0053 
    FGwinsor     0.1221  -0.0123   0.0307   0.0536   0.1567  -0.0355   0.1723 
    FSwinsor     0.0999   0.4174   0.2656  -0.1687   0.0780  -0.2641   0.2977 
    FAwinsor     0.2464   0.0222   0.1484   0.0303  -0.0164  -0.4391   0.1642 
          B4     0.0660   0.1184   0.2297   0.0280   0.1929  -0.2090   0.3018 
    IOwinsor     0.0097   0.0883   0.1378   0.1988   0.6459  -0.3886   1.0000 
    MOwinsor    -0.2096  -0.1244  -0.1014  -0.0531   0.0788   1.0000 
   BHOwinsor     0.0137  -0.0612   0.0530   0.0371   1.0000 
    BIwinsor    -0.0905   0.0784  -0.1115   1.0000 
    BMwinsor    -0.1343   0.1747   1.0000 
    BSwinsor    -0.1108   1.0000 
   TDRwinsor     1.0000 
                                                                             













                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   487.53
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0308833       .1757365
                       e     .0120485       .1097657
               TDRwinsor     .0490907       .2215642
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        TDRwinsor[Firms,t] = Xb + u[Firms] + e[Firms,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0494
                          =       22.40
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(13)     =    70.73
         Variables: BS BM BC BHO MO IO B4 FA FS FGwinsor GDP INF BLR
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest BS BM BC BHO MO IO B4 FA FS FGwinsor GDP INF BLR
                                                   
               Total       260.32    113    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis        17.66      1    0.0000
            Skewness        43.70     13    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity       198.96     99    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0000
         chi2(99)     =    198.96
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
           Prob > F =      0.0001
    F(  1,     105) =     16.623
H0: no first-order autocorrelation





Appendix E: Regression result using OLS 
 




                                                                              
       _cons     .4470724   .2235451     2.00   0.046     .0079019    .8862429
         BLR      .003847   .0112213     0.34   0.732    -.0181981    .0258921
         INF    -.0023273   .0070768    -0.33   0.742    -.0162303    .0115756
         GDP     -.005898   .0066192    -0.89   0.373     -.018902    .0071059
    FGwinsor     .0014922   .0005182     2.88   0.004     .0004742    .0025101
    FSwinsor     .0469588   .0157305     2.99   0.003      .016055    .0778626
    FAwinsor     .0028604   .0006003     4.77   0.000     .0016811    .0040397
          B4      .010244   .0199455     0.51   0.608    -.0289405    .0494284
    IOwinsor    -.0017408     .00056    -3.11   0.002    -.0028409   -.0006407
    MOwinsor     -.001778   .0004751    -3.74   0.000    -.0027113   -.0008447
   BHOwinsor      .001526    .000673     2.27   0.024     .0002039    .0028482
    BIwinsor    -.1347127   .0924419    -1.46   0.146    -.3163214    .0468961
    BMwinsor    -.0439075   .0092438    -4.75   0.000    -.0620676   -.0257474
    BSwinsor    -.0139967   .0045575    -3.07   0.002    -.0229503   -.0050431
                                                                              
   TDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    25.9689818   529  .049090703           Root MSE      =  .20332
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1579
    Residual    21.3303953   516  .041337975           R-squared     =  0.1786
       Model    4.63858654    13  .356814349           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 13,   516) =    8.63
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     530
. reg TDRwinsor BSwinsor BMwinsor BIwinsor BHOwinsor MOwinsor IOwinsor B4 FAwinsor FSwinsor FGwinsor GDP INF BLR
                                                                              
         rho    .71935712   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10976571
     sigma_u     .1757365
                                                                              
       _cons     .2728548   .2793853     0.98   0.329    -.2747303    .8204399
         BLR     .0020891   .0061977     0.34   0.736    -.0100582    .0142364
         INF    -.0002946    .003927    -0.08   0.940    -.0079914    .0074022
         GDP    -.0035077   .0037333    -0.94   0.347    -.0108248    .0038094
    FGwinsor     .0011113   .0003378     3.29   0.001     .0004492    .0017735
    FSwinsor     .0310552   .0258195     1.20   0.229      -.01955    .0816605
    FAwinsor      .002116   .0008793     2.41   0.016     .0003925    .0038394
          B4    -.0006907   .0229043    -0.03   0.976    -.0455824    .0442009
    IOwinsor    -.0018185   .0007652    -2.38   0.017    -.0033182   -.0003188
    MOwinsor    -.0009934   .0006334    -1.57   0.117    -.0022348    .0002481
   BHOwinsor      .001534   .0007944     1.93   0.053    -.0000229    .0030909
    BIwinsor    -.0139679   .0946441    -0.15   0.883     -.199467    .1715311
    BMwinsor    -.0135119   .0083964    -1.61   0.108    -.0299686    .0029449
    BSwinsor    -.0016594    .004967    -0.33   0.738    -.0113946    .0080757
                                                                              
   TDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0002
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =     38.54
       overall = 0.1436                                        max =         5
       between = 0.1777                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0490                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups   =       106
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       530





Appendix G: Regression Result using Fixed Effect 
 
Appendix H: Regression Result using PCSEs 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(105, 411) =    12.95            Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .79381334   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10976571
     sigma_u    .21537517
                                                                              
       _cons     .7237202   .7253436     1.00   0.319    -.7021259    2.149566
         BLR     .0034368   .0063408     0.54   0.588    -.0090276    .0159012
         INF    -.0012639   .0041323    -0.31   0.760     -.009387    .0068592
         GDP    -.0047538   .0040406    -1.18   0.240    -.0126966    .0031889
    FGwinsor     .0011658   .0003637     3.21   0.001     .0004509    .0018807
    FSwinsor    -.0260285   .0722935    -0.36   0.719    -.1681396    .1160826
    FAwinsor     .0000558   .0013272     0.04   0.966    -.0025531    .0026647
          B4    -.0011153   .0268043    -0.04   0.967    -.0538059    .0515754
    IOwinsor    -.0024988   .0011031    -2.27   0.024    -.0046673   -.0003304
    MOwinsor     .0006107   .0008813     0.69   0.489    -.0011217    .0023432
   BHOwinsor     .0021452   .0010058     2.13   0.034      .000168    .0041224
    BIwinsor     .0290876   .1057609     0.28   0.783    -.1788121    .2369874
    BMwinsor    -.0039771   .0091482    -0.43   0.664    -.0219602     .014006
    BSwinsor      .006036   .0057945     1.04   0.298    -.0053545    .0174265
                                                                              
   TDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3726                        Prob > F           =    0.0069
                                                F(13,411)          =      2.27
       overall = 0.0018                                        max =         5
       between = 0.0104                                        avg =       5.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0669                         Obs per group: min =         5
Group variable: Firms                           Number of groups   =       106
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       530
. xtreg TDRwinsor BSwinsor BMwinsor BIwinsor BHOwinsor MOwinsor IOwinsor B4 FAwinsor FSwinsor FGwinsor GDP INF BLR, fe
                                                                              
       _cons     .4470724   .0892143     5.01   0.000     .2722157    .6219291
         BLR      .003847   .0010173     3.78   0.000     .0018532    .0058408
         INF    -.0023273    .001186    -1.96   0.050    -.0046518   -2.86e-06
         GDP     -.005898   .0011727    -5.03   0.000    -.0081965   -.0035996
    FGwinsor     .0014922   .0003564     4.19   0.000     .0007935    .0021908
    FSwinsor     .0469588   .0073334     6.40   0.000     .0325856     .061332
    FAwinsor     .0028604   .0002254    12.69   0.000     .0024186    .0033022
          B4      .010244   .0106978     0.96   0.338    -.0107234    .0312113
    IOwinsor    -.0017408   .0003004    -5.79   0.000    -.0023296   -.0011519
    MOwinsor     -.001778   .0002097    -8.48   0.000    -.0021889    -.001367
   BHOwinsor      .001526   .0003986     3.83   0.000     .0007448    .0023073
    BIwinsor    -.1347127   .0768216    -1.75   0.080    -.2852802    .0158549
    BMwinsor    -.0439075   .0077851    -5.64   0.000     -.059166    -.028649
    BSwinsor    -.0139967   .0035158    -3.98   0.000    -.0208875    -.007106
                                                                              
   TDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        14          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(13)      =   2407.12
Estimated covariances      =      5671          R-squared          =    0.1786
                                                               max =         5
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =         5
Panels:           correlated (balanced)         Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    Years                         Number of groups   =       106
Group variable:   Firms                         Number of obs      =       530
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)





Appendix I: LTDR Regression Result using PCSEs  
 
 




                                                                              
       _cons    -.0449917    .062553    -0.72   0.472    -.1675933    .0776098
         BLR     .0052353   .0011129     4.70   0.000      .003054    .0074167
         INF    -.0029578   .0009426    -3.14   0.002    -.0048052   -.0011103
         GDP    -.0019164   .0009553    -2.01   0.045    -.0037889    -.000044
    FGwinsor    -.0000103   .0003921    -0.03   0.979    -.0007788    .0007581
    FSwinsor     .0348578   .0052077     6.69   0.000     .0246509    .0450647
    FAwinsor     .0000653   .0003221     0.20   0.839    -.0005659    .0006966
          B4    -.0390278   .0112194    -3.48   0.001    -.0610174   -.0170383
    IOwinsor    -.0002344   .0001207    -1.94   0.052    -.0004709    2.22e-06
    MOwinsor     .0000837   .0001154     0.73   0.468    -.0001425    .0003099
   BHOwinsor     .0000942   .0001994     0.47   0.637    -.0002966     .000485
    BIwinsor    -.0245827   .0364921    -0.67   0.501    -.0961058    .0469405
    BMwinsor    -.0343136   .0063245    -5.43   0.000    -.0467094   -.0219178
    BSwinsor     .0046928   .0033666     1.39   0.163    -.0019056    .0112913
                                                                              
  LTDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        14          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(13)      =    635.99
Estimated covariances      =      5671          R-squared          =    0.0924
                                                               max =         5
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =         5
Panels:           correlated (balanced)         Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    Years                         Number of groups   =       106
Group variable:   Firms                         Number of obs      =       530
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
. xtpcse LTDRwinsor BSwinsor BMwinsor BIwinsor BHOwinsor MOwinsor IOwinsor B4 FAwinsor FSwinsor FGwinsor GDP INF BLR
                                                                              
       _cons     .4872391   .1033613     4.71   0.000     .2846547    .6898236
         BLR      .001438   .0016862     0.85   0.394    -.0018668    .0047429
         INF    -.0002561   .0013517    -0.19   0.850    -.0029054    .0023932
         GDP     -.002716   .0013599    -2.00   0.046    -.0053814   -.0000506
    FGwinsor     .0017583   .0004239     4.15   0.000     .0009274    .0025893
    FSwinsor     .0066884   .0073988     0.90   0.366    -.0078129    .0211898
    FAwinsor     .0029155   .0003001     9.71   0.000     .0023272    .0035038
          B4     .0402103   .0117435     3.42   0.001     .0171934    .0632272
    IOwinsor     -.001512    .000301    -5.02   0.000    -.0021019   -.0009222
    MOwinsor     -.001687   .0001602   -10.53   0.000     -.002001    -.001373
   BHOwinsor     .0013997   .0004022     3.48   0.001     .0006115    .0021879
    BIwinsor    -.1503725    .059264    -2.54   0.011    -.2665279   -.0342171
    BMwinsor    -.0050828   .0062187    -0.82   0.414    -.0172711    .0071056
    BSwinsor    -.0154982   .0033514    -4.62   0.000    -.0220668   -.0089296
                                                                              
  STDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        14          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(13)      =    898.78
Estimated covariances      =      5671          R-squared          =    0.1852
                                                               max =         5
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =         5
Panels:           correlated (balanced)         Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    Years                         Number of groups   =       106
Group variable:   Firms                         Number of obs      =       530
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)


















                                                                                    
  STDRwinsor    .3878877  .3600723  .0814654  .8197854  .2060868  .5094461  2.428361
  LTDRwinsor    .1635218  .1231818         0  .4759374  .1449662  .8297303  2.594024
   TERwinsor    .4396899  .4459815  .0137789  .8182208  .2215642 -.1643836  2.226676
   TDRwinsor    .5603101  .5540185  .1817792  .9862211  .2215642  .1643836  2.226676
                                                                                    
    variable        mean       p50       min       max        sd  skewness  kurtosis
. tabstat TDRwinsor TERwinsor LTDRwinsor STDRwinsor, stat (mean median min max sd skewness kurtosis) col(stat)
  STDRwinsor     0.7483  -0.2547   1.0000 
  LTDRwinsor     0.4189   1.0000 
   TDRwinsor     1.0000 
                                         
               TDRwin~r LTDRwi~r STDRwi~r
                                                                              
       _cons     .0161148   .0060923     2.65   0.008     .0041741    .0280555
  STDRwinsor     .9830293   .0149926    65.57   0.000     .9536444    1.012414
  LTDRwinsor     .9961383    .026099    38.17   0.000     .9449851    1.047291
                                                                              
   TDRwinsor        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =         3          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(2)       =   5011.66
Estimated covariances      =      5671          R-squared          =    0.9572
                                                               max =         5
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =         5
Panels:           correlated (balanced)         Obs per group: min =         5
Time variable:    Years                         Number of groups   =       106
Group variable:   Firms                         Number of obs      =       530
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
. xtpcse TDRwinsor LTDRwinsor STDRwinsor
